Four steps Biden must take to reset the nuclear agenda
While the danger of nuclear weapons was rarely mentioned on the U.S. presidential campaign trail, the nuclear weapons policy approaches of the two candidates stood in stark contrast. In the end, the American public rejected a president - one who made both casual and overt threats of nuclear war and repeatedly referred to the most destructive force ever created by humankind as “the nuclear” - for a candidate who agrees with former President Ronald Reagan’s assertion that a nuclear war can never be won, and so must never be fought. Read the latest article on this matter by Deep Cuts Commissioner Alexandra Bell here
Press the Button podcast with Steven Pifer
The latest episode of Press the Button gives a unique look at what is possible for future nuclear policy, and how the nuclear policy field should respond in the face of weakened arms control agreements, increased nuclear arsenal modernization, and a new presidential administration in the United States. Deep Cuts Commissioner Steven Pifer discusses on what the incoming Joe Biden administration can do to reduce nuclear threats when in office. Listen here
Yes, we can? Europe responds to the crisis of multilateral arms control
Over the last four years, Europeans have been facing the fundamental challenge of Russia and the United States turning away from, or even against, arms control. In response, Europe has begun to find its voice, indicating that it is ready to stand up to those great powers dismantling multilateral instruments. In his latest policy brief for the ELN, Deep Cuts Commissioner Oliver Meier considers how Europeans might turn existing, stopgap responses into a long-term strategy to strengthen multilateral arms control instruments. He analyses four elements that currently missing but needed to achieve this goal. Read the full paper here
Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic
Nuclear risk reduction efforts in the Euro-Atlantic should begin with the Russian Federation and the United States ensuring they retain what is left of nuclear arms control and transparency. Activities to increase transparency and verification, even absent specific treaties, are possible and essential to reducing risk perception asymmetries and could create a modicum of trust needed for more ambitious cooperative undertakings. Sustained efforts to address risks inherent to military accidents and to better understand one another’s nuclear doctrines constitute necessary means of trust-building, especially in the context of the strategic competition between the Russian Federation and the United States. Read Deep Cuts Commissioner Ulrich Kühn's latest publication on these matters here
Recording of Briefing on Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control
One day after the U.S. Presidential elections, the Deep Cuts Project held a briefing together with Rose Gottemoeller, Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. She presented her recommendations on how to move forward in the realm of nuclear arms control, based on her recent article Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control in the Washington Quarterly.
Deep Cuts Commissioners Andrei Zagorski, Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at IMEMO, and Götz Neuneck, Senior Research Fellow at the IFSH, commented on the proposals, followed by Q&A. Moderated by Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher at the IFSH Berlin office.
Watch the full briefing here
Sarah Bidgood joins the Deep Cuts Commission
We are excited to announce that Sarah Bidgood joined the Deep Cuts Commission as its most recent member! Sarah directs the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Her research focuses on U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russia non-proliferation and arms control cooperation, as well as the non-proliferation regime more broadly. For more details see here
OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #14 New START: Extension under what Circumstances?
The New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) is at risk of expiring on February 5, 2021. At the same time, there has been no substantial progress in negotiations on a follow-on nuclear arms control agreement. The Trump administration has offered a short-term extension of New START – should Russia agree to a freeze on all U.S. and Russian nuclear warhead stockpiles including non-strategic warheads and to be monitored by unspecified verification measures. This could pave the way to preserving New START, along with an agreement on a politically binding framework for a future agreement. But time appears too short to resolve all questions about the definition and verification of such an arrangement. With this bleak picture, what is the way forward to preserve strategic stability? What realistic scenarios and options exist to prevent a new arms race between Russia and the United States?
Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioners Anatoli S. Diakov, Götz Neuneck, Lynn Rusten here
OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #13 Russian-U.S. Strategic Stability Talks: Where they are and where they should go
Over the decades, Moscow and Washington have held multiple rounds of consultations, dialogues, and negotiations on nuclear arms control and strategic stability. The current round of talks is different from the past, however, because of the dismantlement of the existing arms control architecture. Russia and the United States will soon find themselves in a situation where almost no area of military competition is regulated. This situation is a cause for concern because of the increased risks of crisis escalation and an unconstrained arms race. At the same time, the demise of traditional arms control opens the door to a broad spectrum of potential new arms control negotiations that are without precedent in the post-Cold War era. Should they muster the political will to do so, Russia and the United States now have greater freedom to restructure the arms control architecture, taking into account their interests and those of their allies as well as new technological developments.
Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioners Andrey Baklitskiy, Oliver Meier, and Sarah Bidgood here