Future Formats of Nuclear Arms Control

| Issue Brief

This Deep Cuts Commission Issue Brief analyzes the factors currently shaping the feasibility of nuclear arms control, assesses the suitability of traditional instruments, and proposes alternative formats that could help stabilize relations among the major powers.

PDF download

Abstract

This Issue Brief examines the deteriorating state of nuclear arms control and the shifting political dynamics that shape its current feasibility. It traces the erosion of traditional U.S.–Russian bilateral frameworks from their Cold War successes to today’s deep strategic confrontation rooted in post-Cold War power asymmetries, divergent threat perceptions, and rising domestic hardliners. The analysis highlights how U.S. unilateralism, Russia’s renewed military posture, and escalating tensions over missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and the war in Ukraine have undermined long-standing mechanisms for compartmentalized cooperation. As traditional instruments prove increasingly inadequate, the Brief evaluates alternative approaches, including multilateral formats and broader engagement on emerging technologies, that could contribute to stabilizing great-power relations in a more complex and contested security environment.


DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17828341

Policy recommendations



Think long term
The U.S. and Russia should rebuild direct bilateral arms control dialogue — not limit discussions to existing fora. Early conceptual work now will help future implementation

Envision a package of agreements
Different types of weapons could be governed by separate but coordinated agreements that reflect divergent U.S. and Russian priorities.

Balance linkages and compartmentalization
Because arms control is deeply entangled with political disputes today, negotiators should aim to keep discussions focused on technical issues rather than broader politics

Specify timelines and verifiable steps
Wherever feasible, agreements should include clear deadlines and measurable actions with effective verification

Encourage a culture shift
Arms control practitioners should define realistic success metrics and pursue constructive ideas, rather than dismiss initiatives as impossible.

Engage international organizations when useful
When initiatives align with the mandates of bodies like the IAEA, CTBTO, or OSCE, the U.S. and Russia should involve them.

Invest in education and forward looking capacity
Governments and research institutions should train future experts, produce clear resources on core concepts, and address emerging technologies with practical, verifiable proposals. Framing efforts around risk reduction can increase relevance and impact.

Authors

  • Tobias Fella

    Tobias Fella is Senior Researcher at the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, where he heads the trilateral Challenges to Deep Cuts project. He previously held roles, among others, at the Hertie School and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. In 2022, he conducted lectures and workshops for the German Armed Forces on the political, military, and economic dimensions of the war in Ukraine, preparing units for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania. He holds a PhD in political science from Humboldt University of Berlin.

  • Noah Mayhew

    Noah Mayhew is a Senior Research Associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) where he focuses on nuclear non-proliferation, international nuclear safeguards and nuclear verification, nuclear arms control, and US-Russia relations. Since he joined the VCDNP, he has worked extensively on safeguards matters, including a focus on the State level concept for safeguards, safeguards outreach and capacity building, safeguards and naval nuclear propulsion, and other issues. He also works on US Russian arms control issues, including on questions of verification and monitoring.

  • Daria Selezneva

    Daria Selezneva is a Research Associate at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations. From January to July 2018, she was an intern at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in the WMD Branch, in which capacity she acted as a member of the Secretariat of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. She holds dual Master’s degree in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.