Preserving the Moratorium on Explosive Nuclear Weapons testing
| Issue Brief
One of the key non-proliferation breakthroughs of the past 30 years has been the end of large scale nuclear explosive tests. Accusations of hidden low-yield nuclear tests and threats to match any renewed testing between the nuclear great powers threaten the survival of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the broader non-proliferation architecture. This Issue Brief explores the current challenges and lays out how the moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons testing can be preserved.
Abstract
One of the key non-proliferation breakthroughs of the past 30 years has been the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the end of explosive nuclear weapons testing. All of the P5 states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States) have had declared testing moratoria since signing the CTBT in 1996. Since then, India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) last did so in 2017. Although the CTBT has not entered into force due to the failure of nine key states to ratify, the treaty has established a de facto global moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. But today, the longstanding norm against explosive nuclear testing is under increasing pressure. In the context of great power tensions and erosion of nuclear arms control regimes, the risk of a return to nuclear explosive testing is higher than it has been in decades.
Policy recommendations
To shore up the norm against explosive nuclear testing and reinvigorate steps to bring the CTBT into force, the following actions are needed:
- The P5, individually and collectively, should recommit to upholding their unilateral moratoria on explosive nuclear testing. This should be done immediately and reiterated as a deliverable for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.
- The United States, Russia, and China should undertake unilateral and reciprocal test site transparency and confidence-building measures to confirm that they adhere to a zero-yield standard. They should commence expert dialogue to enhance mutual understanding about how each country understands its moratorium commitment.
- The P5, individually and collectively, should recommit to the CTBT, and pledge to take practical steps toward bringing it into force. P5 support for the CTBT is a high priority deliverable for the NPT Review Conference.
- China and the United States should agree to work in tandem to ratify the CTBT in the same timeframe, and Russia should re-ratify the Treaty. Acting mutually on this issue could facilitate progress in some of these states.
- The P5 should develop tailored strategies to encourage other Annex 2 states to sign and/or ratify the CTBT.
- All NPT state parties and CTBT signatories should make statements in various multilateral fora on the value of the nuclear testing moratoria. In private diplomatic engagements as well as public, they should emphatically call on the P5 and other states with nuclear weapons to uphold their unilateral moratoria and publicly encourage them to develop measures to ensure ongoing activities do not violate the CTBT.
- All CTBT signatories should continue to support and strengthen the CTBTO and IMS system, and should encourage all the Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the Treaty.
- The expert community in P5 states and beyond can help make the case for why the norm against testing and the CTBT advance global security and push back against the notion that nuclear tests provide significant advantages that outweigh the costs of violating the norm against explosive nuclear testing.
- All citizens should make clear their opposition to explosive nuclear testing on international security, humanitarian, and ecological grounds.
