The Risk of Renewed Nuclear Testing

| Working Paper

The end of explosive nuclear weapons testing is one of the key non-proliferation breakthroughs of the past 30 years. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the only state known to have conducted nuclear testing since the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998 and it has not done so since 2017. However, in light of the growing salience of nuclear weapons and a crumbling nuclear arms control architecture, concerns over a resumption of explosive nuclear testing have been on the rise.

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Abstract

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 marked a significant milestone in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, yet the resurgence of nuclear tensions in recent years as well as developments in Russia and the United States, raises concerns about the potential resumption of explosive nuclear testing. This paper examines the shifting geopolitical landscape post the beginning of the February 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war concerning nuclear testing. It highlights increasing activities at nuclear test sites in China, Russia, and the U.S. that could indicate preparations for testing, alongside the enduring challenges posed by the CTBT's ratification process. Despite geopolitical strains, ongoing support for the CTBT by certain states and the efforts of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) persist nevertheless. Therefore, the paper argues for renewed international cooperation in bolstering the CTBT framework to mitigate the risks associated with nuclear testing.




DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.12793671

Policy recommendations

To shore up the norm against nuclear testing and rein- vigorate steps to bring the CTBT into force, we recom- mend the following steps:

  • The P5, individually and collectively, should recommit to the CTBT, working to bring it into force, and upholding their unilateral moratoria on explosive nuclear testing.

  • The United States, Russia and China should undertake unilateral and reciprocal test site transparency and confidence-building measures to improve mutual confidence concerning each party’s activities, intentions and adherence to their moratoria.

  • China and the United States should agree to work in tandem to ratify the CTBT in the same timeframe, and Russia should re-ratify the Treaty. This recommendation is not meant to preclude individual action on the CTBT, but to recognize that acting mutually could facilitate progress in some of these states.

  • The P5 should develop tailored strategies to encourage other Annex 2 states to sign and/or ratify the CTBT.

  • All NPT state parties and CTBT signatories should make individual and collective statements in various multilateral fora on the value of the nuclear testing moratoria and call on the P5 and other states with nuclear weapons to uphold their unilateral moratoria.

  • All CTBT signatories should continue to support and strengthen the CTBTO and IMS system, and should encourage all the Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the Treaty.

  • The expert community in P5 states and beyond can help make the positive case for why the norm against testing and the CTBT advance global security and can help push back against the notion that nuclear tests provide significant advantages65.

Authors

  • Anastasia Malygina

    has considerable experience in teaching arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. In 2007, she participated in the Summer School on International Security held by Moscow-based PIR-Center and contributed to several research projects coordinated by this NGO. In 2013, Anastasia joined a network of Russian university professors who are working together to implement various nonproliferation training and outreach activities in Russia. In February-April 2016, Anastasia was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey (USA). Anastasia is a member of the Working group "Nuclear Disarmament in Policy and International Law" at the Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament at Uppsala University (Sweden). She has written and spoken on strategic stability, nuclear nonproliferation, and strengthening the BWC regime.

  • Hanna Notte

    Hanna Notte is the Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. Her expertise is on Russian foreign policy, the Middle East, and arms control and nonproliferation. Based in Berlin, she regularly writes for outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Financial Times, the New York Times, and War on the Rocks, among others. She is the coauthor of Death Dust: The Rise, Demise, and Future of Radiological Weapons Programs (Stanford University Press, 2023). Notte holds a doctorate and MPhil in international relations from Oxford University and a BA in social and political sciences from Cambridge University.

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  • Lynn Rusten

    Lynn Rusten is the Vice President, Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Before joining NTI in March 2017, Rusten held government positions including senior director for arms control and nonproliferation on the White House National Security Council staff; and in the Department of State served as the chief of staff for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and as a senior advisor in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) where she led the interagency backstopping process supporting the negotiation and ratification of the New START Treaty. She has also served as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee and as Director of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences.