The 'P5' Process
| Working Paper
After his return to the presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin moved to emphasize and modernize Russia's nuclear arsenal. Further steps
in nuclear disarmament, were connected to nuclear disarmament of all nuclear powers, especially the other permanent members o f the UN security council.
Abstract
The 'P5' meetings produced a forum for interesting discussions and constructive general documents, but failed to achieve the principal stated goal: engagement of third nuclear weapon states in the process of nuclear arms limitations and reductions. It looks like there is no prospect of reaching this goal in the future for reasons beside the negative political environment, brought by the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014. Even in case of political resolution of the current crisis and improved international environment, the 'P5' format does not seem promising for the task assigned to it.
This paper analyzes the origins and achievements of the 'P5' process, questions the basic assumptions underlying the process, assesses the chances for engaging Britain, France, and China in nuclear reductions, and gives a number of recommendations for enhancing the process.