How to Address all Nuclear Weapons?

| Working Paper

Despite the reduction in global nuclear arsenals, the existence of nuclear weapons continues to pose a significant global threat and challenge to non-proliferation efforts. While short-term prospects for arms control are limited, this paper outlines the fundamental challenges of addressing all types of nuclear weapons and involving additional nuclear-armed states in future initiatives.

Abstract

Global nuclear arsenals have declined considerably to approximately 13,000 warheads, mainly due to bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between Russia and the United States. However, other states also maintain substantial arsenals that are not covered by these treaties or agreements. China, India, and Pakistan are even expanding their capacities. Current geopolitical tensions hinder further disarmament progress, but future agreements will need to adopt a more inclusive approach involving all nuclear-armed states. This paper discusses various approaches to address all nuclear weapons in order to achieve greater nuclear stability. Additionally, the paper examines potential formats for future negotiations, involving the UNSC Permanent Five and possibly other nuclear-armed states, focusing on risk reduction, confidence-building, and transparency measures.







DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.12207761

Policy recommendations

United States and Russia

  • Restore New START to full functioning.
  • Until a follow-on treaty is negotiated, agree to observe New START’s numerical limits, data exchanges, and notifications after the treaty expires in February 2026.
  • Resume dialogue on nuclear arms and related issues such as missile defense and long-range precision-guided conventional strike weapons.
  • Explore possible agreements covering intermediate-range missiles.

United States and China

  • Begin bilateral dialogue on strategic issues to avert a potential U.S.-China nuclear arms race.

UNSC Permanent Five

  • Intensify dialogue on nuclear arms-related issues including:
    • Early strategic dialogue to discuss a “nuclear balance of power” model.
    • Establishment of a uniform reporting format or database of key information on nuclear weapons inventories, potentially expandable to all nuclear-weapon states.
    • Possible formats for negotiating nuclear reductions and models for agreements on reductions and limitations.
    • Risk reduction measures.
    • Elevate participation level to under-secretary of state equivalent.

Unilateral Nuclear Fail-Safe Reviews

  • Discuss the concept of unilateral nuclear fail-safe reviews.
  • Share information and best practices about reviews being conducted or planned.
  • Ideally, involve all nuclear-weapon states, starting with the UNSC Permanent Five.
  • The United States could consider briefing its review, methodology, and results to encourage others to conduct their own reviews.

Multilateral Approaches

  • Energize discussions within the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification to develop multilateral approaches and technical solutions for warhead identification and inspections.

Authors

  • Steven Pifer

    Steven Pifer is a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution and an affiliate with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Pifer is a retired foreign service officer with over 25 years of experience with the State Department, where he worked on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine (2001-2004), U.S. ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to the President and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council (1996-1997).

  • Lynn Rusten

    Lynn Rusten is the Vice President, Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Before joining NTI in March 2017, Rusten held government positions including senior director for arms control and nonproliferation on the White House National Security Council staff; and in the Department of State served as the chief of staff for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and as a senior advisor in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) where she led the interagency backstopping process supporting the negotiation and ratification of the New START Treaty. She has also served as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee and as Director of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences.

  • Victor Mizin

    Victor Mizin is the Leading Researcher with the Center for International Security at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. From 1978 to 2001, he was on diplomatic service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Russian Federation. He headed the related desks at the Russian Foreign Ministry, was the member of the Russian Mission to the UN in New York and an UNSCOM/UNMOVIC inspector. As a member of official delegations, he took part in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, in particular, on strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) and the Conference on Disarmament.

  • Götz Neuneck

    Götz Neuneck is a Senior Research Fellow at the IFSH and formerly its deputy Director and Head of the interdisciplinary research area “Arms Control and Emerging Technologies”. He is a Professor at the Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics, and Natural Sciences at the University of Hamburg. A physicist by training, he earned his Dr. rer. nat. at the University of Hamburg, Faculty of Mathematics. His research areas include nuclear arms control and disarmament, ballistic missile defense (BMD), missile proliferation, cyber security, non-proliferation of military technology, and outer space technologies.