After the New START treaty

| Fact Sheet

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) reduced U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces to levels not seen since the 1960s. It is the last remaining bilateral agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arms and it expires in February 2026. This Deep Cuts Fact sheet lays out key challenges for finding a follow-on agreement and provides policy options to avoid an unconstrained build-up.

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Abstract

The New START treaty and its predecessors enhanced predictability and stability in the uneasy nuclear deterrence relationship between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. With its expiration in February 2026 an unconstrained three-way nuclear arms race looms triggered by China's decision to increase its nuclear arsenal and the follow-on effects.

Both presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have expressed willingnes to engage on strategic nuclear arms control. However any process faces difficult questions. Key obstacles are the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, the modernization of nuclear arsenals and questions of verification.

Policy recommendations

To avoid an unconstrained arms race Washington and Moscow should consider and pursue the following options:

  • Commit at the presidential level to continue to observe New START’s numerical constraints while the two sides engage in negotiations on a successor agreement. The sides should also explore continuing some of New START’s verification measures.
  • Resume their bilateral dialogue on nuclear arms, strategic stability and related issues and seek to to develop practical measures to reduce nuclear risk.
  • Upgrade the pace of discussions among the UNSC Permanent Five (U.S., Russia, China, UK and France) on possible multilateral confidence-building measures, such as generalizing the U.S.-Russia and Russia-China ballistic missile launch notification agreements to apply to all five states and keeping “humans in the loop” for command and control of nuclear weapons.

The broader international community should:

  • Urge Moscow and Washington to continue to observe the New START numerical limits and resume implementation of transparency measures.
  • Declare their support for confidence-building and transparency measures on long-range conventional strike weapons to limit negative effects on strategic stability due to the deployment of such systems.
  • State that the willingness of Russia and the United States to maintain New START numerical limits will be a yardstick for measuring implementation of NPT Article VI commitments