REGISTER NOW: Briefing on Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control with Rose Gottemoeller
Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control
November 4, 2020
10:00 - 11:00 AM Washington, D.C.
4:00 - 5:00 PM Berlin
6:00 - 7:00 PM Moscow
Please register here and you will receive the Zoom ID and password.
Nuclear arms control faces an uncertain future. The last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, New START, will expire in February 2021, unless Moscow and Washington extend the accord. Looking beyond the near-term, bringing in additional actors, such as China, and capturing new technologies are some of the longer-term challenges.
One day after the U.S. Presidential elections, the Deep Cuts Project invites you to discuss these and related questions with Rose Gottemoeller, Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. She will present her recommendations on how to move forward in the realm of nuclear arms control, based on her recent article Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control in the Washington Quarterly.
Deep Cuts Commissioners Andrei Zagorski, Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at IMEMO, and Götz Neuneck, Senior Research Fellow at the IFSH, will comment on the proposals, to be followed by Q&A.
Moderated by Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher at the IFSH Berlin office.
OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #12 Incorporating Missile Defense in Strategic Arms Control
For some six decades, strategic ballistic missile defenses have played an integral role in the evolution of the strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington. Throughout this time, advocates of such defenses have depicted a future in which these weapons would reduce the risks of nuclear destruction. Yet the historical reality belies such predictions. For thirty years, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty helped moderate pressures to expand nuclear arsenals. Following U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in 2002, the absence of constraints on these systems has made it more difficult to achieve stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive forces. With the world now on the cusp of a new nuclear arms race, these difficulties will increase. It is therefore imperative that strategic missile defense limits be incorporated directly into the structure of strategic arms control – for example, by developing an aggregate ceiling on offensive and defensive weapons.
Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioner Greg Thielmann here
To Reboot Arms Control, Start with Small Steps
After generations of careful and painstaking work to build a global arms control architecture, it is now collapsing. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, is the last legally binding treaty constraining the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals and unless extended, it will expire in less than six months. At the same time, nuclear stockpiles are on the rise, which can lead to a new nuclear arms race, putting every nation on this planet in danger. The situation is dire, but not inevitable or irreversible. Starting with an extension of New START and moving to constructive and fair dialogues on reducing nuclear risks, we can change our collective fate. Read the full article by Deep Cuts Commissioners Andrey Baklitskiy and Alexandra Bell together with Tong Zhao here
Deep Cuts Commission Mourns the Passing of Dennis M. Gormley
The Deep Cuts Commission is deeply saddened to hear about the passing of Dennis M. Gormley, our distinguished colleague and long-time member of the Deep Cuts Commission. In his research, Dennis focused on international security, arms control, and nonproliferation. His deep knowledge of delivery systems – especially of cruise missiles – lay the foundations for innumerable further research projects and will continue to strengthen our understanding of these issues for a long time. He will be very much missed as a colleague, friend, and trusted supporter of the Deep Cuts Project. We extend our deepest sympathy to his family.
Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw U.S. Nuclear Weapons From Europe
Deep Cuts Commissioners Ulrich Kühn and Oliver Meier together with Pia Fuhrhop argue why and how a revitalized debate in Germany offers a path to reducing or removing U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Read the full article in the latest Arms Control Today here
Washington’s Arms Control Delusions and Bluffs
The clock for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty runs out on February 5. The Trump administration has not taken up Russia’s offer to extend the treaty, believing it has leverage to get something more from the Kremlin, and it has even threatened an arms race. This is delusion and bluff. If the administration does not change course, New START will lapse and, for the first time in decades, U.S. and Russian nuclear forces will be under no constraints. Read the full story by Deep Cuts Commissioner Steven Pifer here
Ein neuer Start für die Abrüstung
In German only
Jahrzehnte harter Arbeit sind in die Etablierung einer globalen Architektur zur Rüstungskontrolle geflossen. Heute steht diese jedoch vor dem Zusammenbruch. Sollte der New START Vertrag zur Verringerung strategischer Atomwaffen nicht verlängert werden, dann wird der derzeit einzige rechtlich bindende Vertrag zur Begrenzung der beiden weltweit größten Kernwaffenarsenale in weniger als sechs Monaten auslaufen. Gleichzeitig wachsen die Atomarsenale stetig weiter. Es droht ein neuerliches nukleares Wettrüsten, das alle Länder dieses Planeten in Gefahr bringen würde. Zwar ist die Lage ernst, aber weder unvermeidbar noch unumkehrbar. Noch können wir einen anderen Weg wählen und unser kollektives Schicksal ändern. Der vollständige Artikel von Deep Cuts Commissionern Alexandra Bell und Andrey Baklitskiy sowie Tong Zhao ist online hier
Prospects and Implications for New START Extension
What is the future of the arms control architecture that has provided some stability in the years of the Cold War and its aftermath? What are the prospects for new negotiations to account for, reduce and eliminate US and Russian nuclear weapons? What is the likelihood of other nuclear-weapon states to join the negotiations? What implications will this have on the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)? Angela Kane addressed these questions during a hearing of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords All-Party Parliamentary Groups on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, as well as the group on the United Nations. Read more here