A Two-Pronged Approach to Revitalizing U.S.-Russia Arms Control

| Working Paper

This Working Paper assesses the state of the current NATO-Russia relationship, examines the bilateral arms control relationship and prospects for future progress, proposes options to reduce the risks of conflict between NATO and Russia, and strengthen strategic stability, and lastly makes the case for unilaterally adjusting the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and responds to arguments against such an adjustment.

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Abstract

There is an urgent need for the United States and Russia to pull their relationship back from the brink. An early agenda for bilateral engagement should focus on options to reduce the risks of unintended conflict, lessen incentives for escalation, including to the possible use of nuclear weapons, reinforce existing arms control mechanisms, and eliminate obstacles to new risk-reduction initiatives. In addition, the United States should be prepared to right-size U.S. nuclear forces to the lowest level necessary to meet deterrence requirements, which could put pressure on Russia to follow suit.

Authors

  • Victor Mizin

    Victor Mizin is the Leading Researcher with the Center for International Security at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. From 1978 to 2001, he was on diplomatic service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Russian Federation. He headed the related desks at the Russian Foreign Ministry, was the member of the Russian Mission to the UN in New York and an UNSCOM/UNMOVIC inspector. As a member of official delegations, he took part in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, in particular, on strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) and the Conference on Disarmament.