Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic
Nuclear risk reduction efforts in the Euro-Atlantic should begin with the Russian Federation and the United States ensuring they retain what is left of nuclear arms control and transparency. Activities to increase transparency and verification, even absent specific treaties, are possible and essential to reducing risk perception asymmetries and could create a modicum of trust needed for more ambitious cooperative undertakings. Sustained efforts to address risks inherent to military accidents and to better understand one another’s nuclear doctrines constitute necessary means of trust-building, especially in the context of the strategic competition between the Russian Federation and the United States. Read Deep Cuts Commissioner Ulrich Kühn's latest publication on these matters here
Recording of Briefing on Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control
One day after the U.S. Presidential elections, the Deep Cuts Project held a briefing together with Rose Gottemoeller, Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. She presented her recommendations on how to move forward in the realm of nuclear arms control, based on her recent article Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control in the Washington Quarterly.
Deep Cuts Commissioners Andrei Zagorski, Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at IMEMO, and Götz Neuneck, Senior Research Fellow at the IFSH, commented on the proposals, followed by Q&A. Moderated by Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher at the IFSH Berlin office.
Watch the full briefing here
Sarah Bidgood joins the Deep Cuts Commission
We are excited to announce that Sarah Bidgood joined the Deep Cuts Commission as its most recent member! Sarah directs the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Her research focuses on U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russia non-proliferation and arms control cooperation, as well as the non-proliferation regime more broadly. For more details see here
OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #14 New START: Extension under what Circumstances?
The New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) is at risk of expiring on February 5, 2021. At the same time, there has been no substantial progress in negotiations on a follow-on nuclear arms control agreement. The Trump administration has offered a short-term extension of New START – should Russia agree to a freeze on all U.S. and Russian nuclear warhead stockpiles including non-strategic warheads and to be monitored by unspecified verification measures. This could pave the way to preserving New START, along with an agreement on a politically binding framework for a future agreement. But time appears too short to resolve all questions about the definition and verification of such an arrangement. With this bleak picture, what is the way forward to preserve strategic stability? What realistic scenarios and options exist to prevent a new arms race between Russia and the United States?
Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioners Anatoli S. Diakov, Götz Neuneck, Lynn Rusten here
OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #13 Russian-U.S. Strategic Stability Talks: Where they are and where they should go
Over the decades, Moscow and Washington have held multiple rounds of consultations, dialogues, and negotiations on nuclear arms control and strategic stability. The current round of talks is different from the past, however, because of the dismantlement of the existing arms control architecture. Russia and the United States will soon find themselves in a situation where almost no area of military competition is regulated. This situation is a cause for concern because of the increased risks of crisis escalation and an unconstrained arms race. At the same time, the demise of traditional arms control opens the door to a broad spectrum of potential new arms control negotiations that are without precedent in the post-Cold War era. Should they muster the political will to do so, Russia and the United States now have greater freedom to restructure the arms control architecture, taking into account their interests and those of their allies as well as new technological developments.
Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioners Andrey Baklitskiy, Oliver Meier, and Sarah Bidgood here
REGISTER NOW: Briefing on Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control with Rose Gottemoeller
Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control
November 4, 2020
10:00 - 11:00 AM Washington, D.C.
4:00 - 5:00 PM Berlin
6:00 - 7:00 PM Moscow
Please register here and you will receive the Zoom ID and password.
Nuclear arms control faces an uncertain future. The last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, New START, will expire in February 2021, unless Moscow and Washington extend the accord. Looking beyond the near-term, bringing in additional actors, such as China, and capturing new technologies are some of the longer-term challenges.
One day after the U.S. Presidential elections, the Deep Cuts Project invites you to discuss these and related questions with Rose Gottemoeller, Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. She will present her recommendations on how to move forward in the realm of nuclear arms control, based on her recent article Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control in the Washington Quarterly.
Deep Cuts Commissioners Andrei Zagorski, Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at IMEMO, and Götz Neuneck, Senior Research Fellow at the IFSH, will comment on the proposals, to be followed by Q&A.
Moderated by Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher at the IFSH Berlin office.
OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #12 Incorporating Missile Defense in Strategic Arms Control
For some six decades, strategic ballistic missile defenses have played an integral role in the evolution of the strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington. Throughout this time, advocates of such defenses have depicted a future in which these weapons would reduce the risks of nuclear destruction. Yet the historical reality belies such predictions. For thirty years, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty helped moderate pressures to expand nuclear arsenals. Following U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in 2002, the absence of constraints on these systems has made it more difficult to achieve stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive forces. With the world now on the cusp of a new nuclear arms race, these difficulties will increase. It is therefore imperative that strategic missile defense limits be incorporated directly into the structure of strategic arms control – for example, by developing an aggregate ceiling on offensive and defensive weapons.
Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioner Greg Thielmann here
To Reboot Arms Control, Start with Small Steps
After generations of careful and painstaking work to build a global arms control architecture, it is now collapsing. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, is the last legally binding treaty constraining the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals and unless extended, it will expire in less than six months. At the same time, nuclear stockpiles are on the rise, which can lead to a new nuclear arms race, putting every nation on this planet in danger. The situation is dire, but not inevitable or irreversible. Starting with an extension of New START and moving to constructive and fair dialogues on reducing nuclear risks, we can change our collective fate. Read the full article by Deep Cuts Commissioners Andrey Baklitskiy and Alexandra Bell together with Tong Zhao here