Prospects and Implications for New START Extension

What is the future of the arms control architecture that has provided some stability in the years of the Cold War and its aftermath? What are the prospects for new negotiations to account for, reduce and eliminate US and Russian nuclear weapons? What is the likelihood of other nuclear-weapon states to join the negotiations? What implications will this have on the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)? Angela Kane addressed these questions during a hearing of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords All-Party Parliamentary Groups on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, as well as the group on the United Nations. Read more here

OUT NOW: Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 on a Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe

A Little of the Old, a Little of the New: A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control (CAC) in Europe

The ongoing NATO–Russia confrontation has increased the risk of military conflict, particularly in Europe. The military relationship between Russia and NATO is far less stable than political leaders may assume and poses increasing risks in particular sub-regions.

This paper offers a new approach to CAC, taking into account how a variety of European actors perceive their threat environment and what they worry about most. This includes regional force concentrations and options for their reinforcement, LRS capabilities, and naval forces. It focuses on the Baltic and Black Sea subregions as a matter of priority. To show why a new approach to CAC is necessary, this paper first addresses the issues of threat perceptions and how military capabilities can drive conflict and escalation. It then offers solutions by outlining the necessary elements of future CAC agreements and possible negotiation formats. Read the latest Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Commissioners Wolfgang Zellner, Olga Oliker, and Steven Pifer here

Nuclear Weapons: It’s Time for Sole Purpose

The Democratic Party platform states that Democrats believe that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons should be to deter and - if necessary, retaliate against - a nuclear attack. Presidential candidate Joe Biden has said the same. This would mark a significant change in U.S. nuclear policy, eliminating ambiguity that preserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack. Read the full article by Deep Cuts Comissioner Steven Pifer here

Spinning good news on arms control

U.S. and Russian officials held a series of consultations on nuclear arms control matters this summer, in the fourth year of the Trump administration. Though tardy, one can only welcome these meetings, particularly as the last remaining U.S.-Russian nuclear arms treaty – the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) – expires in just five months. Read the full article by Deep Cuts Commissioner Steven Pifer here

Yes We Can? Europäische Antworten auf die Krise der Rüstungskontrolle

In German only

Europäer finden erste erfolgreiche Antworten auf die Abwendung Russlands und der USA von der Rüstungskontrolle. Sie konzentrieren sich zunehmend auf ihre eigenen Interessen, sprechen eine klare Sprache, kooperieren zum Erhalt der Rüstungskontrolle auch mit schwierigen Partnern und sind bestrebt, eigene rüstungskontrollpolitische Instrumente zu entwickeln. Im neuen IFSH Policy Brief geht Deep Cuts Commissioner Oliver Meier der Frage nach, welche weiteren Schritte notwendig wären, damit Europa der Krise der internationalen Rüstungskontrolle gezielt entgegentreten kann. Der Policy Brief ist online hier

REGISTER NOW: Briefing on how to prevent a nuclear arms race in Europe after the demise of the INF Treaty

After the demise of the INF Treaty:
How to prevent a nuclear arms race in Europe


September 21, 2020


9:00 - 10:00 AM Washington, D.C.
3:00 - 4:00 PM Berlin, Geneva
 4:00 - 5:00 PM Moscow

Please register here and you will receive the Zoom ID and password.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was one of the most important nuclear arms control agreements. After the INF treaty's demise in August 2019, a key challenge is reducing the risk of a new nuclear arms race in Europe. A verifiable moratorium on the deployment of new nuclear weapons is one proposal being debated.

Pavel Podvig runs his own research project on Russian Nuclear Forces and is a Senior Researcher in the WMD Programme at UNIDIR. He will present the Deep Cuts Issue Brief “Nuclear Weapons in Europe after the INF Treaty” and discuss his recommendations on how to monitor an arrangement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Rüdiger Bohn, Deputy Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control at the German Federal Foreign Office, and Katja Keul, spokeswoman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament for the Green Party in the German Bundestag, will comment on the proposals. Moderated by Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher at the Berlin office of the IFSH.

This briefing will be held under the Chatham House Rule, with plenty of time for Q&A.

Uncharted Waters: Europe and the End of Nuclear Arms Control

In the summer of 2019, the Administration of US President Donald Trump decided to quit the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Since 2014, the United States had been publicly accusing Moscow of violating the Treaty by flight-testing a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in the ranges banned by the INF Treaty (500–5,500 km). Subsequently, US officials expressed concerns that Russia might have started to produce more missiles than needed to sustain a flight-test program. Russia rejected the accusations and tabled a number of counter-allegations against the United States. The diplomatic back-and-forth finally culminated in the US’ decision to withdraw from the Treaty - a decision with potentially wide-ranging repercussions for the security of Europe and East Asia. Read the full article by Deep Cuts Commissioner Ulrich Kühn here

Getting Back on Course

Seventy-five years after the horrific atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we all still live under the existential threat of a catastrophic nuclear war. Although citizen pressure and hard-nosed U.S. diplomacy have yielded agreements that have cut the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, prevented their proliferation, and banned nuclear testing, there are still far too many nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear war is growing. Events and decisions in the coming weeks will determine our nuclear future for years to come. Deep Cuts Commissioner Daryl G. Kimball recommends key elements of an action plan to get the world back on the road toward a world without nuclear weapons here