

# Deep Cuts Commission Joint Statement ON EXPIRATION OF NEW START AND IMPERATIVE FOR ENDURING NUCLEAR RESTRAINT AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

We express our profound concern that, following the expiration of the US-Russian Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) on 5 February 2026, there will be no bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between the two countries for the first time in decades. This will reduce nuclear stability and predictability, threaten global security, and increase the risk of a new era of unconstrained nuclear competition.

Following the expiration of the New START, the Russian Federation and United States will be free to increase the number of deployed strategic warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers beyond the limits established by the Treaty.

On 22 September 2025 Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that “Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026” provided that “the United States acts in a similar spirit and refrains from steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence.” United States President Donald Trump said on 5 October 2025 that the Russian initiative “sounds like a good idea.”

To reduce the negative effects of the New START’s expiration and facilitate progress on a follow-on agreement, we call for the following urgent action:

- ▶ Both sides should agree to continue to respect the central limits of New START, which would create a more conducive environment for talks on strategic stability.
- ▶ The Russian Federation and the United States should restart bilateral talks on a new strategic stability and nuclear arms control framework at the earliest possible date. Such talks should ideally address limits on strategic nuclear weapons, as well as new understandings regarding sub-strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range systems, strategic missile defenses, and other challenges to strategic stability.

Concrete and meaningful nuclear restraint by the United States and Russia, including continued adherence to the global moratorium on nuclear test explosions, and the resumption of sustained nuclear arms control talks would also signal to the rest of the world that Moscow and Washington are serious about implementing their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), ahead of the 2026 Review Conference.

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*Affiliations are for identification purposes only and do not reflect institutional positions.*

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Additional information about the “Challenges to Deep Cuts”-  
project can be found on [deepcuts.org](https://deepcuts.org). The project is funded by  
the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs