Re-engaging on European Security

• States should commit to fully support all efforts to resolve the Ukraine crisis on the basis of due respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia and the West should take immediate steps to prevent any unintended military incidents and restrain military activities in areas where such incidents may occur. NATO, its member states and Russia should, inter alia, avoid activities which may be seen as provocative by the other side, and re-establish military-to-military communications.

• OSCE participating States should initiate a focused dialogue within the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation with the purpose of exploring what kind of conventional arms control, including CSBMs, would be appropriate to reverse the current dynamic, and what future measures should be considered in order to reflect the new security landscape in Europe.

• OSCE participating States should initiate a targeted discussion of diverging national viewpoints on the essentials of European security, reconfirming fundamental OSCE principles and spelling out measures to give stronger effect to them. With its OSCE Chairmanship in 2016, Germany is positioned to lead such efforts.

Preserving and Strengthening Strategic Stability

1. The United States and Russia should continue to implement New START and should explore resuming a comprehensive dialogue across the whole spectrum of strategic stability issues. To prepare for such a dialogue, both should make increased use of low-key Track 1.5/2 formats.

2. NATO and Russia should avoid provocative statements and actions in the nuclear realm and should reinitiate military-to-military discussions on practical measures to avoid possible dangerous incidents between their military forces, particularly between nuclear-capable military forces, for instance by reviewing the status of – and possible new issues for – the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Talks.

3. The United States and Russia should begin discussions on further strategic nuclear force reductions below the New START limits, try coming to an understanding on missile defense, and begin discussing definitions and limits on conventional strategic arms, particularly hypersonic, boost-glide vehicles.
**Strengthening the INF Treaty**

1. The United States and Russia should remain committed to the INF Treaty and should supplement high-level political discussions with the involvement of technical experts.

2. U.S. and Russian technical experts should address compliance issues of the INF Treaty as well as consider adapting the Treaty in light of evolving weapons developments; discussing the issue of ballistic missile targets for missile defense; distinguishing armed drones from prohibited ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs); and offering transparency measures regarding U.S. missile defense installations in Poland and Romania, perhaps in return for Russian transparency to address U.S. concerns about the alleged Russian testing of an intermediate-range GLCM.

3. The United States and Russia could consider options for negotiating a ban on their nuclear-armed SLCMs and for using INF Treaty precedents to promote negotiations on banning missiles of greater than 3,000 km in regions outside of Europe.

**Engaging Third Nuclear Powers**

1. The P5 states should intensify their efforts in pursuit of nuclear disarmament by undertaking discussions on the effects their nuclear postures have on regional and global stability, and the effects missile defenses and long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems have on regional and global stability.

2. The United Kingdom, France and China should unilaterally commit not to increase their nuclear force levels as long as the United States and Russia are reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals.

3. The P5 states should also consider the option of inviting India and Pakistan to join in a “P5+2” process, giving new momentum to achieving the goal of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

**Building on the NPT Regime**

1. States Parties to the NPT should make the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s Action Plan the point of departure and point of reference for any nuclear arms control initiatives at the 2015 Review Conference and should commit to increased nuclear transparency.

2. At the upcoming 2015 Review Conference to the Treaty, States Parties to the NPT should recall the Trilateral Initiative’s Model Verification Agreement on IAEA monitoring of fissile material holding, building on it to negotiate their own fissile material verification arrangements with the IAEA.

3. States Parties to the NPT should call for the creation of an international center for nuclear disarmament research, development, testing and demonstration of fissile material.