
Options for Further Strategic Reductions

1. Russia and the United States should initiate talks on a New START follow-on agreement mandating additional significant and stabilizing cuts—for example, establishing limits of 500 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 1,000 deployed strategic warheads for each side.

2. In order to enhance prospects for achieving a follow-on agreement, the United States should accelerate New START-mandated reductions ahead of the 2018 implementation deadline; the United States and Russia could consider further independent, reciprocal force reductions below New START ceilings.

3. Russia and the United States should reinvigorate bilateral strategic stability talks with the goal of pursuing confidence-building initiatives that help to address concerns relating to missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, conventional precision-guided weapons, and outer space weapons. They should at the same time engage other nuclear-weapon states and encourage them to improve transparency and eventually to freeze or reduce their arsenals, using any useful precedents from the U.S.-Russian experience.

Addressing Tactical Nuclear Weapons

1. The United States and Russia should reconfirm their mutual commitment to the 1991 and 1992 PNIs, undertaking confidence-building measures such as exchanging data on the total number of nuclear warheads destroyed over the past twenty years, and conducting site visits to former but now empty storage facilities.

2. The United States and Russia should resume the U.S.-Russian dialogue of nuclear experts in order to develop non-intrusive measures to provide for verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Germany should take the lead within NATO to formulate a coherent NATO policy on the role of TNWs in Europe and terms for their withdrawal.

Transforming Nuclear Doctrines

1. The United States and Russia should initiate a jointly defined and regular dialogue on nuclear doctrines and help to deepen the NATO-Russia discussions on doctrines and strategies.

2. The United States and Russia should start a dialogue on their respective nuclear alert modes. Their aim should be to sharpen each other’s understanding and to work towards adopting measures to increase decision time for responding to what might be an attack on their nuclear deterrent force.

3. The United States and Russia should exchange declarations of intent regarding nuclear use, underscoring that a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent does not require the ability to retaliate immediately.
Cooperating on Missile Defense

1. Russia and the United States should intensify efforts to make their BMD capabilities more transparent, considering the options of data exchanges on certain technical criteria and joint annual exercises on the tactical and theater BMD level.

2. NATO should make more explicit the connection between Iran's nuclear and missile threats and the pace and scope of NATO's EPAA deployments.

3. NATO and Russia should initiate discussions about long-term options for a joint NATO-Russian BMD study center and/or a center for NATO-Russian surveillance and monitoring of missile threats and space objects, possibly building on the NATO-Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative.

Dealing with Conventional Precision-Guided Weapons

1. The United States and Russia should open up a dialogue on threat perceptions, definitions, and possible transparency measures for conventional PGWs, including prompt and non-prompt weapons; discussions could seek to address questions of strategic stability and concerns emanating from large-scale deployments of conventional cruise missiles.

2. The United States and Russia should consider the option of additional confidence-building measures (such as launch notification and exchange of testing data) for existing strategic conventional arms, currently not accountable under New START.

3. The United States and Russia should explore options for confidence-building measures on conventional sea-launched cruise missiles, particularly data exchanges of a politically binding nature (e.g., declaring a maximum deployment number for conventional SLCMs and the normal SLCM loads on different classes of submarines and surface ships on an annual basis).

Modernizing Conventional Arms Control in Europe

1. NATO should arrive at an early proposal for CAC in Europe that opens the way for consultations with Russia on modernizing CAC and opening it up for new non-aligned states parties.

2. All parties concerned should strive to elaborate an all-European framework of CAC that combines substantially lower ceilings for CFE-limited conventional equipment with limitations of new weapons categories and complex military capabilities as well as a regime of verifiable transparency measures.

3. States could supplement this framework by specific sub-regional arrangements, which combine earlier NATO-Russia pledges such as not permanently stationing additional substantial combat forces with new instruments such as limitations on the quantity and type of conventional forces.