

The TPNW and the NPT

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On October 24, 2020, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) reached the 50th ratification needed for it to become legally binding. The treaty will enter into force on January 22, 2021.¹ The Secretary-General of the United Nations will convene a first meeting of states parties within one year.²

Also in 2021, states parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are scheduled to meet for the 10th Review Conference which was postponed from May 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both meetings will tackle the crisis in nuclear disarmament and arms control – but from different angles. The TPNW challenges the parameters of the nuclear-weapons discourse that has prevailed for decades. It also challenges the predominance of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) in the NPT.

This paper looks at possible convergences between the NPT and the TPNW: How can the international community ensure complementarity between the two treaties? How can states parties to the NPT and the TPNW jointly advance nuclear disarmament, to their mutual benefit? And how could such cooperation be constructively reflected in the outcome of the 10th NPT Review Conference?

Positions on the TPNW

Proponents of the TPNW call attention to the constant threat of a possible nuclear weapon use that would have catastrophic, lasting global humanitarian and environmental consequences. For them, as the only weapon of mass destruction not yet outlawed, nuclear weapons are the most

inhumane and indiscriminate ones, without any military utility. They also point out that over the last decades, incidents have become known in which nuclear weapons were nearly used due to miscalculation or accidents and that the inclusion of new advanced technologies into military strategies and infrastructure further increases these risks. Additionally, they argue that the production, maintenance, and modernisation of nuclear weapons adds massive economic costs, leaving less public funds to meet basic human needs. According to the proponents of the TPNW, the only way to tackle these issues is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their prohibition under international law.

Opponents of the TPNW maintain that it is impossible and counterproductive to discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons in isolation from the international security environment. The NWS and their allies dispute the need for another treaty on nuclear disarmament. They fear that the TPNW would fuel disagreement among NPT member states and assert that only inclusive discussions among all stakeholders can reinforce international security and stability.

122 states adopted the TPNW in 2017. By mid-January 2021, 51 states had ratified and 86 states had signed the treaty.³ Russia, the United States and its allies, as well as other nuclear weapon possessor states remain in strong opposition to the TPNW.⁴

Europe is the region most divided on the TPNW.⁵ Four European states, namely Austria, Ireland, Malta, and San Marino, have ratified the treaty. However, NATO members France and the United

Kingdom possess nuclear weapons and four EU member states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands) as well as Turkey host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements.⁶ They oppose the TPNW. NATO calls itself a nuclear alliance and while NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated in early November 2020 that the Alliance’s “ultimate goal [is] a world free of nuclear weapons,” he also said in the same speech that NATO’s nuclear deterrent is its “strongest deterrent.”⁷ A December 2020 NATO statement on the TPNW emphasized that “we collectively reiterate our opposition to this treaty.”⁸ France and the United Kingdom made their opposition to the TPNW particularly clear, stating that they “do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it.”⁹ At the same time, there is a large constituency in Europe that supports nuclear disarmament. Public opinion polls show that majorities of the public in inter alia Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands support the TPNW.¹⁰

Russia does “not see any opportunity for the TPNW to make a meaningful contribution to limiting and reducing nuclear weapons” and believes that “it could cause irreparable damage to the NPT and its nuclear non-proliferation framework.” Therefore, “Russia will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty.”¹¹

Shortly before the TPNW’s 50th ratification, the Donald Trump administration tried to actively prevent its entry into force by sending letters to then-signatories. While acknowledging the sovereignty of those states, Washington urged them to withdraw their instruments of ratification or accession, asserting that the TPNW would be “dangerous” and its supporter had “made a strategic error.”¹² It remains to be seen whether a Joe Biden administration will seek a different approach. As a Presidential candidate, Biden has argued that “the use of even one nuclear weapon

would be catastrophic, cause significant casualties, and result in enduring radiation that could affect millions of humans, as well as the environment.” He acknowledged that “[t]here would be no ‘winners’ in a nuclear exchange.”¹³

The P5 also stressed in a joint statement that they “will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms.”¹⁴

Points of Contention regarding the TPNW

The TPNW prohibitions go beyond the NPT in a few but important ways. The TPNW requires its states parties to “never under any circumstances develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”¹⁵ Further, TPNW states parties must never under any circumstances “use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, nor are they allowed to assist nuclear weapon programs.¹⁶

TPNW critics question whether it is effective to “outlaw” nuclear weapons while the NWS oppose such an approach. In addition to this political question, they have raised other issues why the TPNW in their view “risks undermining the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.”¹⁷

One of the most critical points is the legal relation between the NPT and TPNW. Article 18 of the TPNW states that “the implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations [...] with regard to existing international agreements [...] where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.”¹⁸ Some have raised concerns that this paragraph could be interpreted in a way that the NPT might be legally “subordinate” to the

TPNW – at least if one assumes an inconsistency between member states obligations under the respective accords.¹⁹

Another criticism is that the TPNW “risks undermining [...] the IAEA Safeguards regime” and that some of its provisions are not effectively verifiable.²⁰ The TPNW states that each NNWS states party shall – at a minimum – maintain the safeguard agreements with the IAEA which are in force at the time of its ratification of the TPNW.²¹ According to the critics, the TPNW fails to make the Additional Protocol the standard of verification.²² Indeed, participants in the TPNW negotiations considered making the implementation of the Additional Protocol mandatory but decided against it. And neither does the NPT make them mandatory. Additional protocols remain a voluntary measure and they are currently in force in 136 states.²³ Moreover, critics stress that the TPNW lacks verification procedures to effectively monitor full and irreversible nuclear disarmament.²⁴

Additionally, there is criticism on the lack of analytical depth and clarity of key concepts and definitions in the TPNW, for instance regarding the “threat to use nuclear weapons” or the scope of “assistance” in the treaty’s provisions. These ambiguities leave room for legal interpretations and would need to be discussed further to reduce uncertainty.

Focusing on Convergence

Both the TPNW and NPT lack some clarity and definitions of key aspects. However, both treaties support the same norms and follow the same core principle: cessation of the nuclear arms race through nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to enhance global security and strengthen the international community. To this end, every state party to the NPT as well as every state party

to the TPNW has committed itself to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The NPT and the TPNW are neither adversarial, nor are they in conflict.²⁵

The NPT constitutes the “cornerstone” of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, which is also directly reaffirmed in the TPNW. The NPT establishes a foundation with its three pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that sense, the NPT undeniably needs – and always has needed – further instruments for its full implementation. In fact, a comprehensive set of instruments has been developed in accordance with the NPT to strengthen the objectives of its pillars.

In that light, disarmament obligations can be – and long have been – reinforced through treaties. For instance, several bilateral U.S.-Russian agreements contain references to NPT Article VI obligations: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT I), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) states that the United States and Russia, with the arms control measures laid out in the treaty, are “committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI [...] and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat.”²⁶ States parties at NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences also included references to treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in final documents and recommendations.²⁷ These treaties are understood to be (future) instruments in support of the three NPT’s pillars and especially in promoting the implementation of Article VI. Likewise, Article VII of the NPT states that “nothing in this Treaty affects

the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,” and, thus, clearly legitimizes the formation of NWFZs.²⁸

Of course, there are also other formats used to pursue NPT disarmament objectives. Besides these treaties, most states parties to the NPT are part of additional initiatives which are enabling stakeholders with various views to work together and harmonize efforts. There are different formats of such initiatives, for instance the P5, the International Partnership for Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative, or the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament.²⁹

In line with these formats, the TPNW adds a further dimension as a legally binding treaty. It “constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons” and is one of several legal instruments conducive to the implementation of the NPT disarmament objectives and specifically Article VI.³⁰

The way forward

As the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the NPT presents the best foundation to reconcile various viewpoints. Recognizing the value of the TPNW for disarmament progress at the upcoming NPT Review Conference would reaffirm that the NPT is indeed the primary venue to jointly tackle nuclear weapon reductions and, thus, strengthen the treaty itself. Such a constructive approach would ensure that the NPT keeps its legitimacy. Recognizing the value of the TPNW as a necessary complement to NPT disarmament obligations,

might also reduce the risk that some TPNW supporters could “ditch the NPT.”³¹ All states parties to the NPT should focus on preventing such a development.

Nuclear risk reduction

NPT states parties could focus on measures to strengthen nuclear risk reduction efforts. The TPNW refers to the risks posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons as well as their role in nuclear doctrines and military planning. It mentions especially the dangers of nuclear weapon use by accident or miscalculation.³² Likewise, the NPT is not only about nuclear disarmament in the sense of a numerical decrease of nuclear weapons, but also with regard to reducing the risks of accidental nuclear weapon use and the overall role of nuclear weapons in defense and security policies.³³

There are several pending issues related to nuclear risk reduction, for instance: What can be done to avoid the growing reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies? What factors are critical for reducing the risk of nuclear weapon use in the current geopolitical situation? How to decrease confrontation and lessen tension between states?³⁴ It would be beneficial to tackle these questions at the upcoming NPT Review Conference and to try to embed them in the broader arms control agenda as well as to connect them to disarmament objectives.

Some TPNW supporters have raised concerns about risk reduction as there are different views on the substance and framing of the issue. However, there are a range of proposals on possible measures which are of joint interest. For instance, to add practical measures to the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, such as de-targeting, a No-First-Use (NFU) policy, or non-interference in Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence systems.³⁵

Risk reduction efforts would also go some way towards fulfilling NPT states parties' political obligations to pursue measures of transparency, confidence-building, and cooperation.³⁶ In that regard, joint exercises are another example of a risk reduction measure through international cooperation. In June and August 2020, for instance, the United States and Russia carried out joint exercises and patrols in the Bering Sea.³⁷ Such moments of cooperation between the United States and Russia are rare these days, yet this is exactly what is needed to foster trust and confidence. Such efforts could lead to cooperation in further areas of shared interest. It is not unusual to specifically address bi-, tri-, or multilateral initiatives or commitments which are of importance towards the fulfillment of the NPT objectives. Importantly, the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences regularly refer to efforts that have been or should be made in that regard.³⁸

Victim assistance and environmental remediation

Providing assistance to victims of nuclear weapons-related activities and environmental remediation has been a difficult topic for the NWS. The United Kingdom tested nuclear weapons abroad, the United States and France in their own countries and abroad, China and the Soviet Union in their own countries (when Kazakhstan was one of the Republics). Compensation to victims has been disputed, though some NWS have paid some but only voluntarily. The TPNW puts a renewed focus on these issues and could help advance efforts in this area.

Article 6 of the TPNW outlines obligations related to victim assistance and environmental remediation for individuals and territories under their control. This includes “medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide [...] social and economic inclusion” for people who suffer from nuclear weapon use or testing.³⁹

This also applies to environmental remediation of areas contaminated by nuclear weapon use or testing. TPNW Article 7 encourages the establishment of an international assistance framework for treaty implementation, including for reducing the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapon related activities.⁴⁰

The NPT states parties have begun to address these issues at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Final Document of the 8th Review Conference acknowledges the “problems of safety and contamination” caused by former nuclear weapon programs and calls for concrete actions in that regard. It firstly welcomes the attention to the problems of “safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas” wherever possible. Secondly, it encourages all entities which are in a position to do so, to give further appropriate assistance in the “clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants [...] for remedial purposes in these affected areas.”⁴¹ In addition, the final document refers to a number of international conventions that are establishing a global nuclear liability framework with both national and international mechanisms to provide compensation in case of a nuclear accident or incident for affected people, property, and the environment.⁴²

Education on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation

Another issue of mutual interest for NPT and TPNW states parties lies in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation education. Indeed, the necessity for promoting education in these areas is undisputed and it is international consensus that educational attention would foster the pursuit of arms control and disarmament aims. In this light, Action 22 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document calls upon all states to implement the recommendations of the UN study on disarmament and

non-proliferation education which are outlined in the report of UN Secretary-General António Guterres.⁴³

The NPT states parties emphasize the need for education and training in disarmament and non-proliferation with a special focus on weapons of mass destruction and state that “the overall objective [...] is to impart knowledge and skills to individuals to empower them to make their contribution [...] to the achievement of concrete disarmament and non-proliferation measures and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”⁴⁴

The TPNW equally refers to the importance of the further development and dissemination of the principles and norms of peace and disarmament through education and raising awareness.⁴⁵ TPNW supporters often highlight the educational and awareness-raising role of the treaty: It created momentum, pushed the disarmament agenda ahead, generated wide-spread interest, and brought many new and young people to the field of disarmament and arms control.⁴⁶

The NPT and TPNW share their aim in educating and training the next generation of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation experts. States parties to both treaties alike should assume their responsibility to ensure that the available resources are being used to their fullest extent and to reach as many interested newcomers as possible. They should seek to harmonize their efforts to provide funding and support to relevant international organizations, educational institutions, and programs.

With regard to all of these topics, it should be recognized that there must be a special focus on the gender dimension. The TPNW states that the “catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons [...] have a disproportionate impact on women and

girls” and, inter alia, mentions the need for adequate “age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination.”⁴⁷ These issues have also been addressed at various NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences with a frequent call to promote gender equality and diversity and to integrate gender perspectives into the NPT.⁴⁸ The TPNW strengthens this call and could set an incentive to further efforts in this regard.

Looking ahead

This paper outlines three aspects that would assist in creating a more productive atmosphere this year, when the NPT Review Conference and the TPNW Conference of States Parties will take place in close proximity in time: risk reduction, victim assistance, and disarmament education.

The first issue, *risk reduction*, refers to the necessity for NWS to ensure that nuclear weapons are indeed “safe,” for instance with regard to possible miscalculation or misunderstanding in conflict. Blanket assurances are not enough. The pursuit of risk reduction measures should be more transparent as the argument that military sensitivities prevent disclosing of information often rings hollow. Proposals have been put forward for action but mostly not taken up for implementation by the NWS.⁴⁹

The second issue, *recognition of and compensation for the damage caused by nuclear testing*, is one that remains central to justice for the people affected. It reflects a shift to include humanitarian law in the TPNW, and the helplessness and discrimination experienced by the affected people has resulted not only in immense grief but also frustration due to the lack of access to records, to deliberate stalling, and subterfuge by the countries that conducted nuclear tests. To openly accept the responsibility and offer some remedy would set positive signals.

The third issue, *disarmament education*, is important even though it may be seen more of a goodwill effort than one of substantively advancing the implementation of NPT obligations. Still, states have underlined their joint commitment to engage in this endeavor through the NPT, though concrete follow-up is not yet very robust.

The issues mentioned might not encompass all points of convergence between the NPT and the TPNW – there are surely more topics to draw upon for the mutual benefit of the two treaties and their respective states parties alike. To begin with, it is most important that they start to focus on shared interests.

In discussing convergences between the NPT and the TPNW and getting to the core of underlying issues, states could succeed in improving the action plan for reducing the levels of violence, discrimination, and all types of inequity in global politics. The TPNW reenergized the role of civil society efforts and the humanitarian dimension in the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation discourse which previously was often exclusively state-centric. It should be recognized that open, inclusive, and evidence-based public debate is vital for achieving the goals of the NPT. Such joint diplomatic, political, and intellectual efforts would serve as confidence-building mechanisms which – in combination with practical steps in the field of arms control – could help finding ways of instrumentalizing resources to gradually decrease

tensions in international relations, avoid dangerous miscalculations, and sustain incentives for arms control.

Efforts need to be made on both sides of the political divide. The 122 countries that adopted the TPNW represent more than half of the world's population. Even if they were already committed under the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons, the TPNW has advanced – for all – the ethical norm against this weapon of mass destruction. It will also be incumbent on the NWS to demonstrate a serious commitment to fulfilling the disarmament agreements reached by consensus at the NPT Review Conferences in 1995, 2005, and 2010. Enhancing transparency by accepting a standard reporting format could be a first step towards accountability.

It took the NPT almost 30 years to reach near-universal status. While the NPT does not have an implementation body or secretariat, a global network of various instruments guarantees the institutional capacity of the NPT regime. In that sense, the existence of the TPNW has become a political reality which also opponents of the treaty cannot ignore. States which are not an official party to the TPNW will hopefully refrain from continuing their campaign to discredit the TPNW and its supporters. It would also be important for them, if they have the capacity to do so, to take part as observers in meetings of the TPNW – to show not only good intentions but also their commitment to the adherence of international treaties.⁵⁰

Endnotes

- 1 “Historic milestone: UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reaches 50 ratifications needed for entry into force”, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), October 24, 2020. https://www.icanw.org/historic_milestone_un_treaty_on_the_prohibition_of_nuclear_weapons_reaches_50_ratifications_needed_for_entry_into_force.
- 2 United Nations General Assembly, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/8, United Nations 2017, Article 8, 2. <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 3 In 2017, the UN General Assembly decided to convene a conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. All member states were encouraged to take part, also with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives. The conference took place in New York on March 27 – 31 and June 15 – July 7. The TPNW was adopted on the last day of that conference by a vote of 122 States in favor, with one vote against, and one abstention.
- 4 According to the U.S. letter, the five NPT NWS and NATO allies “stand unified in [...] opposition to the potential repercussions [of the TPNW].” See Edith M. Lederer, “US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty”, Associated Press (AP), October 22, 2020. <https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-weapons-disarmament-latin-america-united-nations-gun-politics-4f109626a1cdd6db10560550aa1bb491>.
- 5 See “The status of the TPNW” on Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, <https://banmonitor.org/tpnw-status>.
- 6 For a short discussion of how NATO member states could join the TPNW, see Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Five Common Mistakes on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, War on the Rocks, November 16, 2020. <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/five-common-mistakes-on-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/>.
- 7 See the speech as delivered by Jens Stoltenberg at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, November 10, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_179405.htm.
- 8 “North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force”, NATO, December 15, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180087.htm?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=natopress&utm_campaign=20201215_nac.
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- 12 Edith M. Lederer, “US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty”, Op. cit.
- 13 “Presidential Candidates: Joe Biden”, Council for a Livable World, October 2020, <https://livableworld.org/presidential-candidates-joe-biden/>.
- 14 “P5 Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, October 24, 2018. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/p5-joint-statement-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons>.
- 15 See Article 1, 1. (a) of the TPNW. <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 16 See Article 1 (d) and (e) of the TPNW. <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 17 “North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force”, NATO, December 15, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180087.htm?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=natopress&utm_campaign=20201215_nac.
- 18 See Article 18 of the TPNW, <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 19 On this debate see Tytti Erästö, “The NPT and the TPNW: Compatible or conflicting nuclear weapons treaties?”, SIPRI, March 6, 2019. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2019/npt-and-tpnw-compatible-or-conflicting-nuclear-weapons-treaties>.
- 20 “North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, NATO, September 20, 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/news_146954.htm.

- 21 See, for instance, Articles 1, 3, and 4 of the TPNW, <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
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- 25 See, for instance, Tytti Erästö, “The NPT and the TPNW: Compatible or conflicting nuclear weapons treaties?”, SIPRI, March 6, 2019. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2019/npt-and-tpnw-compatible-or-conflicting-nuclear-weapons-treaties>.
- 26 See the respective preambular of SALT I, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/text/salt1.htm>; START I, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/start1.htm#ArtI>; SORT, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/sort/sort.htm>; and New START, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf>.
- 27 See, for instance, Actions 10, 11, and 15 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
- 28 See Article VII of the NPT, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>. And, for instance, Action 9 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
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- 31 Joellen Pretorius and Tom Sauer, “Is it time to ditch the NPT?”, February 27, 2020. <https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/is-it-time-to-ditch-the-npt/>.
- 32 See TPNW text p. 1, <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 33 See, for instance, the first sentence of the NPT preamble, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>; and 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, Action 5, p. 21, [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
- 34 For more details on risk reduction see, for instance, Andrey Baklitskiy, Sarah Bidgood, Oliver Meier, “Russian-U.S. Strategic Stability Talks: Where they are and where they should go”, Deep Cuts Issue Brief #13, October 2020, p. 9, https://deepcuts.org/files/pdf/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief_13-Russian_US_Strategic_Stability_Talks.pdf. For a comprehensive report on possible risk reduction measures see Wilfred Wan, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: A Framework for Analysis”, UNIDIR, June 28, 2019, <https://www.unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-framework-analysis>.
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- 36 See, for instance, Action 19 on p. 24 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document as well as Actions 2, 5 (g), and 44. [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
- 37 See “Russian border guards, US Coast Guard conduct joint patrolling in Bering Sea”, TASS, June 11, 2020, <https://tass.com/society/1063239>. And “Пограничники США и России провели совместное патрулирование в Беринговом проливе”, Interfax News Agency, August 11, 2020, <https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=536118&lang=RU>.
- 38 This is expressed, inter alia, in Action 3 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document. Action 4 of that document specifically mentions efforts of the U.S. and Russia on their bilateral agreement, see p. 20,

- [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)). Something similar has also been done, for instance, in the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conference and Japan's commitments in China.
- 39 See Article 6, 1. of the TPNW, <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 40 See Article 7 of the TPNW, <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 41 See paragraphs 70 and 71 on p. 11 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
- 42 See paragraphs 76 and 77 on p. 12 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
- 43 See 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, Action 22, p. 24, [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).
- 44 “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/124, United Nations General Assembly, August 30, 2020, p. 1. <https://unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/report-of-the-secretary-general-eng-0-19.pdf>.
- 45 See TPNW preamble, <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 46 The educational role of the TPNW was discussed, for instance, by Beatrice Fihn and Togzhan Kassenova at the webinar “The UN Nuclear Ban Treaty Enters Into Force in January: Then What?” which was held by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on November 13, 2020. A recording of the webinar is available here <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57qfn52D4RU>.
- 47 See TPNW preamble and TPNW Article 6, <https://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.
- 48 For an up-to-date and comprehensive compilation of efforts to include gender sensitive aspects into the NPT framework, see “Gender in the Non-Proliferation Treaty: recommendations for the 2020 Review Conference”, Working paper submitted by Ireland, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.48, May 7, 2019. <https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.48>. Also see “Improving gender equality and diversity in the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process”, Working paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Ireland, Namibia, Sweden and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.25, April 18, 2019. <https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.25>.
- 49 See, for instance, “Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, House of Lords, Select Committee on International Relations, 7th Report of Session 2017–19, April 24, 2019. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/338/338.pdf>; Wilfred Wan, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: The State of Ideas”, UNIDIR, 2019. <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/nuclear-risk-reduction-the-state-of-ideas-en-767.pdf>.
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About Deep Cuts

The Deep Cuts Commission provides decision-makers as well as the interested public with concrete policy options based on realistic analysis and sound research. Since it was established in 2013, the Commission is coordinated in its deliberations by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Arms Control Association (ACA), and the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO, RAN) with the active support of the German Federal Foreign Office and the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg.

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