В данном разделе содержится информация о новых докладах и статьях по вопросам международного контроля над вооружениями и разоружения. Эта информация составляется сотрудниками проекта по проблемам глубоких сокращений ядерных вооружений, работающими в Институте исследования пробоем мира и политики безопасности, и не обязательно отражает мнение Комиссии или ее отдельных членов.

 

1....... Missile Defense

2....... Strategic Nuclear Weapons

3....... Tactical Nuclear Weapons

4....... Conventional Precision-Guided Weapons

5....... Conventional Arms Control in Europe

6....... Transparency and Verification

7....... Nuclear Doctrines

8....... Global Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

 

1. Missile Defense

 

Antonov, Anatoly.

“Missile Defense Is the Litmus Test of Readiness for Effective Cooperation.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 3 (2011): 3–6.

 

Barzashka, Ivanka.

“Obama's missile defence flexibility: What could, and should, it mean?”

London: ELN 2013.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/obamas-missile-defence-flexibility-what-could-and-should-it-mean_520.html

 

Barzashka, Ivanka.

“On missile defense, verify to trust.”

Washington, D.C.: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Online Edition) January, 2014.
http://thebulletin.org/missile-defense-verify-trust

Abstract:

President Obama wants to negotiate “bold reductions” to US and Russian nuclear forces, while building a missile defense system to counter a limited attack from potential adversaries like Iran and North Korea. But Moscow worries that evolving US and NATO defenses, mixed with nuclear and conventional precision-strike weapons, could eventually undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Until its concerns are addressed, Russia won’t agree to a new arms control treaty and has threatened countermeasures. To resolve the standoff, various proposals for cooperation have been made, but prospects for an agreement have seemed grim. While fundamental differences remain, President Putin agreed with President Obama in June that “what we certainly must and can do in [the missile defense] area is make all our actions more open and transparent.” Transparency is a necessary condition for the success of ambitious cooperative proposals that could increase both US and Russian security. For example, coordinating a joint response against ballistic missile attacks from third countries—the core of NATO’s offer to Russia—is difficult if either side believes the other's defenses could be used against it.

 

Dickow, Marcel, Oliver Meier, Max Mutschler, and Michael Paul.

“The case for rethinking NATO missile defense plans.”

Washington, D.C.: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Online Edition) November, 2013.
http://www.thebulletin.org/case-rethinking-nato-missile-defense-plans

Abstract:

At its November 2010 Lisbon summit, NATO agreed to establish a joint missile defense system to protect against long-range ballistic missile attack. That project is still in its early stages. The United States has deployed a first ship, armed with interceptors, in the Mediterranean. Over the next couple of years, similar naval deployments are scheduled to follow. In parallel, missile defense sites are being constructed in Poland and Romania. From 2018 on, the territory of all NATO members is supposed to be protected against limited missile attacks. Because of uncertainties about future missile threats to NATO, a lack of support among US allies, and financial risks, however, the allies would be well advised to pause and reassess missile defense plans before proceeding with the system’s further implementation.

 

Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI).

“Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm.”

Washington, D.C.: Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) 2012.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WGP_MissileDefense_FINAL.pdf

 

Futter, Andrew.

“NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.”

European Security 20, no. 4 (2011): 547–562.

 

Khodakova, Alexandra.

“Missile Defense: Where Does the Danger Lie?”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 18, no. 1 (2012): 37–46.

 

Kulesa, Lukasz.

“Poland and Ballistic Missile Defense: The Limits of Atlanticism.”

Proliferation Papers 48, Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) 2014.
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/lukaszkulesa52f898ba1ac86.pdf

Abstract:

Since Poland first expressed its willingness to host a critical part of the US Ballistic Missile Defense architecture, in 2002, the program has undergone several setbacks. Today, while Poland is still expected to host key elements of the US BMD capabilities, contributing to NATO’s territorial defense against ballistic missile threats, Warsaw does not enjoy the kind of special bilateral relationship that it was trying to secure with Washington. Domestic politics, changing threat assessments, the US ‘reset’ policy vis-à-vis Russia and the latter’s critics of BMD’s destabilizing character all contributed to this change, which, in turn, had strong consequences for Poland’s strategic posture. It sparked the recent Polish decision to acquire national air and missile defense capabilities, both as a strategic asset for the country’s own deterrence posture and as a national contribution to the NATO BMD system. It also influenced Poland’s attempt to reconcile its long-term national interests and threat perception with BMD’s greater role within the Alliance, both by emphasizing NATO’s collective defense mission and by ensuring that nuclear weapons would remain at the heart of NATO’s deterrence posture.

 

Lucien, Claire.

“Europe's Attitude Toward Missile Defense and the Russian Proposal.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 3 (2011): 33–41.

 

Mankoff, Jeff.

“The politics of US missile defence cooperation with Europe and Russia.”

International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 329–347.

 

O'Rourke, Ronald.

“Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf

 

O'Rourke, Ronald.

“Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf

 

O'Rourke, Ronald.

“Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41526.pdf

 

Pifer, Steven.

“Would an Iran Deal Obviate Missile Defense in Europe?”

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution December, 2013.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/02-iran-deal-obviate-missile-defense-europe-pifer

 

Piotrowski, Marcin Andrzej (Ed.).

“Regional Approaches to the Role of Missile Defense in Reducing Nuclear Threats.”

Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) 2013.
http://www.pism.pl/Publications/Reports/PISM-Report-Regional-Approaches-to-the-Role-of-Missile-Defence-in-Reducing-Nuclear-Threats#

Abstract:

The importance of the issue of missile defence was underlined at the end of 2012 and in the first few months of 2013 by several events, including Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defence, NATO’s Patriot deployments to the Turkish–Syrian border and the nuclear and missile crisis in North Korea. The report adds to the ongoing discussion about the relationship between missile defence and nuclear deterrence while keeping in mind the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons promoted by the current U.S. administration. The interconnections between missile defence and nuclear deterrence are complicated. While in some cases MD development can lead to a decrease in nuclear arsenals, in some regions it might have a more negative effect of fuelling nuclear arms races. The added value of the report is its wide range: readers will find perspectives on missile defence presented by authors dealing with these issues in not only the transatlantic and European contexts but also in Russia, the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East. Regardless of the various perspectives, contexts and conclusions of the report’s individual chapters, there is no disagreement that missile defence is already influencing the thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence. It also reveals that the interconnections between missile defence and nuclear deterrence might be more complicated than any idealistic expectations about the former as a substitute for the latter. 

 

Russian International Affairs Council.

“10 Years Without the ABM Treaty: The Issue of Missile Defense in Russia-US Relations.”

Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council 2012.
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=845#top

Abstract:

What is the real threat posed by the U.S. Missile Defense to Russia now and in the foreseeable future? What are the possibilities of reaching military and political compromise on missile defense? These issues are dealt with in this short version of the scientific paper entitled "Ten years without the ABM Treaty. The issue of missile defense in Russia-US relations" authored by experts from the Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the research program of the Russian International Affairs Council.

 

Turkowski, Andrzej.

“Russian Debate on Missile Defence in Europe.”

Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) 2013.
http://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-1-454

 

Wilkening, Dean A.

“Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia?”

Survival 54, no. 1 (2012): 31–52.

 

2. Strategic Nuclear Weapons

 

Acton, James M.

“Bombs Away? Being Realistic About Deep Nuclear Reductions”

The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 37–53.
https://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springacton.pdf

 

Acton, James M.

“Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions.”

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2011.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/low_numbers.pdf

Abstract:

As U.S. policy seeks to create the conditions that would allow for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia can undertake a practical approach to their stockpiles to 500 nuclear warheads each and those of other nuclear-armed states to no more than about half that number.

 

Acton, James M., and Michael S. Gerson.

“Beyond New START: Advancing U.S. national security through arms control with Russia : a report of the CSIS Next Generation Working Group on U.S.-Russian Arms Control.”

Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2011.
http://csis.org/files/publication/110824_Acton_BeyondNewSTART_WEB.pdf

Abstract:

This report concludes that an additional round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control is in the national security interest of the United States, but will be extremely difficult, given the two sides' divergent capabilities, interests, and objectives. The report lays out the key issues that are likely to be discussed and offers some practical recommendations, on both substance and process, that should allow the United States and Russia reach a mutually beneficial agreement.

 

Antonov, Anatoly.

“Further Nuclear Arms Limitation: Factors and Prospects.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 19, no. 2 (2013): 13–22.

Abstract:

The New START treaty between Russia and the United States has entered into force. Under the terms of the treaty, by 2018 the Russian and U.S. strategic offensive arsenals will be brought below the new ceiling of 700 deployed delivery systems and 1,550 warheads deployed on these systems. The treaty stipulates a large number of measures which must be accomplished within a clearly defined time frame. The implementation of some of those measures began even before the ratification; others have yet to be rolled out. Several of the measures agreed in the treaty have already been implemented. First and foremost, Russia and the United States have exchanged initial data on the composition and the location of their strategic offensive weapons arsenals at their military bases. They have also put together teams of inspectors and conducted several demonstrations stipulated by the treaty. They have begun inspection visits under the new procedures. Finally, they have launched a consultation mechanism in the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Experts and officials attending the commission's sittings discuss practical issues pertaining to the implementation of the treaty. During the winter 2012 session of the BCC (held on January 24–February 7) they “signed agreements about exchanging telemetry information for ICBM and SLBM launches, to be submitted by each Party, and about the procedures for conducting demonstrations of information storage mediums and/or equipment for the reproduction of telemetry data.” They have also reached an agreement “about the number of ICBM and SLBM launches for which telemetry information will be exchanged in 2012.” The question is, what next? Are deeper strategic offensive arms reductions after the expiration of the latest START treaty possible, or indeed necessary?

 

Arbatov, Alexei.

Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security.

Moscow: IMEMO, 2011.
http://www.imemo.ru/ru/publ/2011/11003.pdf

 

Arbatov, Alexei.

“Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control.”

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2011.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/gambit_endgame.pdf

Abstract:

While nuclear arms control is enjoying a renaissance of late, whether that momentum dissipates or leads to further agreements will require a painstaking effort by U.S. and Russian diplomats and experts to move past Cold War prejudices and the mistakes and misunderstandings of the post-Cold War era.

 

Arbatov, Alexei, and Vladimir Dvorkin.

“Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation.”

Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012.
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/154700/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/870c02c3-6f1d-4773-8bfd-22752fd10b46/en/nuclear_reset_Book2012_web.pdf

Abstract:

This book addresses the multifaceted and extremely complex problem of nuclear weapons in the world today and for the foreseeable future. The assessments and practical proposals presented naturally do not exhaust all of the contemporary national and international security issues associated with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. They concern only the most important problems, which are examined in rational sequence and in conjunction with each other. In this sense, the analysis presented in this book may be considered to be a "road map" to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation over the next decade.

 

Barzashka, Ivanka, Timur Kadyshev, Götz Neuneck, and Ivan Oelrich.

“How to avoid a new arms race.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 25 July 2011.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-to-avoid-new-arms-race

Abstract:

NATO is creating its own missile defense system -- instead of relying solely on the U.S. system -- which could provide better opportunities for NATO cooperation with Russia than would bilateral talks with the United States alone. Russia is deeply concerned that a future NATO system could compromise Russia's strategic arsenal. Joint operations -- through cooperation on threat assessments, combined military exercises, and sharing technology and information -- are key to building trust between Russia and NATO.

 

Betts, Richard K.

“The Lost Logic of Deterrence.”

Foreign Affairs 92, no. 2 (2013): 87–99.

 

Blair, Bruce, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev.

“One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses.”

Science & Global Security 19, no. 3 (2011): 167–194.
http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs19blair.pdf

Abstract:

Nuclear exchange models using Monte Carlo methods were used to test the stability of U.S.-Russian deterrence for reduced nuclear force sizes off alert in the presence of missile defenses. For this study U.S. and Russian weapons were partitioned into a postulated First Echelon, consisting of single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be generated in hours to launch-ready status, and into a postulated Second Echelon of more diverse nuclear forces including multiple-warhead, road-mobile and sea-based systems that require days to weeks to become launch ready. Given reasonable estimates of weapons characteristics, First Echelon nuclear forces can survive to retaliate in numbers that satisfy the requirements of deterrence, given limitations on the numbers of missile defense interceptors, a result which is bolstered by the added capabilities of the more deeply de-alerted Second Echelon.

 

Blank, Stephen J.

“Russia and the Current State of Arms Control.”:

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2012.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1119.pdf

Abstract:

Arms control remains the central issue in U.S.-Russian relations for many reasons, including the respective capabilities of these two states and their consequent responsibility for preventing both nuclear proliferation and the outbreak of war between them. The bilateral relationship is usually directly proportional to the likelihood of their finding common ground on arms control. To the extent that they can find such ground, chances for an agreement on what have been the more intractable issues of regional security in Eurasia and the Third World grow, and the converse is equally true. The chapters in this volume focus on Russian developments in arms control in the light of the so-called New Start Treaty signed and ratified in 2010 by Russia and the United States in Prague, Czech Republic.

 

Blank, Stephen J.

“Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future.”:

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2011.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1087

Abstract:

This book presents several essays analyzing Russia’s extensive nuclear agenda and the issues connected with it. It deals with strategy, doctrine, European, Eurasian, and East Asian security agendas, as well as the central U.S.-Russia nuclear and arms control equations. This work brings together American, European, and Russian analysts to discuss Russia’s defense and conventional forces reforms and their impact on nuclear forces, doctrine, strategy, and the critical issues of Russian security policies toward the United States, Europe, and China. It also deals directly with the present and future roles of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy and strategy.

 

Cimbala, Stephen J.

“Forever young: START and aftermath.”

European Security 20, no. 1 (2011): 143–154.

 

Cimbala, Stephen J.

“Obama's Second Term: Prospects for Nuclear Arms Reductions.”

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 3 (2013): 357–370.

Abstract:

The second term of the Obama administration will doubtless see efforts by the United States to move forward its nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda, especially with Russia. However, there is no certainty of accomplishment in this regard, and much depends upon the political chemistry between a reelected U.S. President Barack Obama and a re-reelected Russian President Vladimir Putin after 2012.1 This discussion considers the political setting and military options for post-New START strategic nuclear arms reductions, as well as other military-strategic and political issues within which U.S., Russian, and NATO nuclear arms control options are embedded.

 

Colby, Elbridge A. and Michael S. Gerson

“Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations.”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1144

Abstract:

What is strategic stability and why is it important? This edited collection offers the most current authoritative survey of this topic, which is central to U.S. strategy in the field of nuclear weapons and great power relations. A variety of authors and leading experts in the field of strategic issues and regional studies offer both theoretical and practical insights into the basic concepts associated with strategic stability, what implications these have for the United States, as well as key regions such as the Middle East, and perspectives on strategic stability in Russia and China. Readers will develop a deeper and more developed understanding of this consent from this engaging and informative work.

 

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2013.

Dvorkin, Vladimir.

“Nuclear Disarmament: Stressing the Key Impediments.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 18, no. 4 (2012): 63–72.

 

International Security Advisory Board.

“Report on Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Force Reductions.”

Washington, D.C. 2012.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/201403.pdf

 

Kokoshin, Andrei.

“Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions.”

Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center 2011.
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/Ensuring Strategic Stability by A. Kokoshin.pdf

 

Kristensen, Hans M.

“New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms: Categories of U.S. Data Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms As of September 1, 2012.”

Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists November, 2012.
https://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/armscontrol/NewSTART_USnumbers090112.pdf

 

Kristensen, Hans M.

“Trimming Nuclear Excess Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces.”

Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists 2012.
https://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf

 

Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris.

“Russian nuclear forces, 2013.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 3 (2013): 71–81.

Abstract:

Russia is in the middle of modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era ballistic missiles with fewer improved missiles. In a decade, almost all Soviet-era weapons will be gone, leaving a smaller but still effective force that will be more mobile than what it replaced. As of early 2013, Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,800 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage, along with 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. There is some uncertainty in these estimates because Russia does not disclose how many nuclear weapons it has and the United States has stopped releasing data supplied by Russia under strategic arms reduction agreements. The authors use public statements made by Russian officials, newspaper articles, observations from commercial satellite images, private conversations with government officials, and analysis of Russian nuclear forces over many years to provide the best available unclassified estimate of Russian nuclear forces.

 

Kubiak, Katarzyna, Ian Williams, and Paul Ingram.

“Summary of International Workshop: 'Prospects for Russian-U.S. Arms Control'.” Moscow: CENESS, ACA, BASIC, IFSH 2013.
http://www.armscontrol.org/files/May-6-Moscow-Conf-Rpt-final.pdf

On May 16th, 2013 a roundtable workshop on prospects for the next round of nuclear arms control talks between Russia and the United States was jointly held by the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Arms Control Association (ACA), the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (IFSH), with support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. A group of 40 officials, diplomats, and experts from Russia, the United States, and NATO countries considered each party’s objectives, political and technical opportunities, and possible areas and ideas that could help advance progress for discussions and possible negotiations on strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, as well as offensive and defensive ballistic missiles. This summary higlights key points and issues discussed. With the exception of the opening presentations (most of which are published here, in full), the event took place under Chatham House rules and as such the paper does not attribute the views expressed to any specific individual at the meeting. Larsen, Jeffrey A, Justin V. Anderson, Darci Bloyer, Thomas Devine, Rebecca D. Gibbons, and Christina Vaughan.

“Qualitative Considerations of Nuclear Forces at Lower Numbers and Implications for Future Arms Control Negotiations.” Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies 2012.
http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP68.pdf

 

Lewis, Jeffrey.

“Bar Nunn: The U.S. and Russia never really cured their nuclear mistrust. And now it's come back.”

Foreign Affairs, OCTOBER 17, 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/17/bar_nunn

Abstract:

Nunn-Lugar, the post-Cold War program best known for securing "loose nukes," is probably coming to end -- at least in Russia. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Interfax, "The agreement doesn't satisfy us, especially considering new realities." Realities are such a bummer. There is some hope that the United States and Russia might yet save the Nunn-Lugar program, but the "new realities" mentioned by Ryabkov have been slowly strangling the bilateral arms control process. For two decades, our bilateral arms control efforts with Russia have been largely about reducing our bloated nuclear arsenals. Although those reductions were welcome, they were never the most important part of the process. The promise of arms control with the Russians was always more about building a more stable relationship -- initially with nuclear weapons and then perhaps, dare to dream, the security of a world without them. But neither side managed to create a truly cooperative effort to manage nuclear dangers. We've failed. And now, the two countries are running out of reductions to make, leaving only an awkward inability to deal with the real issues that truly threaten us.

 

Orlov, Vladimir.

“Nuclear Disarmament: next Steps for Russia and the United States.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 2 (2011): 1–3.

 

Péczeli, Anna.

“Negotiated cuts: A new nuclear weapons treaty is not the only option.”

Washington, D.C.: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Online Edition) January, 2014.
http://thebulletin.org/negotiated-cuts-new-nuclear-weapons-treaty-not-only-option

 

Pifer, Steven.

“Arms Control Helps Contain the Ukraine Crisis.”

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution April, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/04/10-arms-control-help-contain-ukraine-crisis-russia-pifer.

Abstract:

The Ukraine crisis has plunged U.S. and Western relations with Russia toward a post–Cold War low. The damage will continue for some time, especially in the event of a Russian military incursion into eastern Ukraine. Among the victims could be further progress on arms control. Yet arms control is now all the more valuable. It puts important bounds on an increasingly confrontational U.S.-Russian relationship.

 

Pifer, Steven.

“Arms Control, the Strategic Triad and Tight Budgets.”

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution November, 2013.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/11/20-arms-control-strategic-triad-tight-budgets-pifer

 

Pifer, Steven.

“Beyond START: Negotiating the Next Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions.”

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 2009.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2009/5/arms reduction pifer/05_arms_reduction_pifer.PDF

 

Pifer, Steven.

“How U.S.-Russia Relations Complicate Obama’s Nuclear Arms Legacy.”

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution April, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/04/02-obama-prague-nuclear-agenda-five-years-pifers.

Abstract:

Speaking on Prague’s Hradčany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama laid out his vision for managing nuclear arms. After major strides in 2009-2010, progress slowed, due to domestic political opposition and Moscow’s recalcitrance—and also to the administration’s timidity. With U.S.-Russia relations on a downward slide, securing a transformational legacy on nuclear weapons may be slipping out of the president’s reach.

 

Pifer, Steven.

“The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START.”

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 2010. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2010/11/12-arms-control-pifer/12_arms_control_pifer

 

Pifer, Steven, and Michael E. O'Hanlon.

The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms.

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.

Abstract:

For some observers, nuclear arms control is either a relic of the cold war, or a utopian dream about a denuclearized planet decades in the future. But, as Brookings scholars Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon argue in The Opportunity, arms control can address some key security challenges facing Washington today and enhance both American and global security. Pifer and O'Hanlon make a compelling case for further arms control measures--to reduce the nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, to strengthen strategic stability, to promote greater transparency regarding secretive nuclear arsenals, to create the possibility for significant defense budget savings, to bolster American credibility in the fight to curb nuclear proliferation, and to build a stronger and more sustainable U.S.-Russia relationship.

 

Podvig, Pavel.

“Russia's Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization.”

Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) 2011.
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/pp37podvig.pdf

 

Primakov, Yevgeny, Igor Ivanov, Yevgeny Velikhov, and Mikhail Moiseev.

“Moving from Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Security.”

Izvestia Daily October 14, 2010.
http://www.abolitionforum.org/site/moving-from-nuclear-deterrence-to-mutual-security/

Abstract:

The time has come to move toward a new stage of disarmament and realize the principal of multilateral actions that will become an important step toward forming a new world order for the 21st century. In such context nuclear arms are rather not an end in itself but one of the principal directions, precondition and a way to reorganize international life on more civilized basis, in literal sense of this meaning and in accordance with the imperatives of our century.

 

Quinlivan, James T., and Olga Oliker.

“Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States.”

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2011.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1075.pdf

Abstract:

This monograph examines how U.S. Air Force strategic forces contribute to and are affected by the evolving relationship with Russia. This study starts with the recognition that the simple numbers and destructive power of both countries’ nuclear arsenals continue to drive at least a baseline requirement to deter the other, even though no adversarial intent exists on either side. In other important ways, however, the interests that the two sides are claiming, protecting, or advancing have changed profoundly from those of the Cold War. The American forces that constituted “deterrence” during the Cold War were matched to a vision of how conflict could come about—primarily in Europe—and how that conflict would be conducted. Changed interests and, thus, changed ways in which interests diverge mean that these visions necessarily no longer hold, although Europe remains a consistent region of concern to both countries. To effectively incorporate deterrence in the context of the current relationship with Russia, in which both sides profess not to see the other as an adversary, we must understand how both Russia and the United States might envision conflict emerging and progressing. The Air Force has always had a special role in understanding the possible use of nuclear weapons in any conflict. This monograph looks at whether and how the possible Russian use of such weapons in the particular context of conflict escalation in a Europe or near-Europe scenario might evolve. If nuclear weapons are employed in the future, they will be employed in different ways from what might have been expected in the past—which means that the mechanisms needed to avert such developments are similarly new. The implications for the Air Force extend beyond those formally charged with the stewardship of nuclear weapons.

 

Reif, Kingston.

“Nuclear weapons cuts will make the United States safer.”

Washington, D.C.: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Online Edition) 2013.
http://www.thebulletin.org/nuclear-weapons-cuts-will-make-united-states-safer-0

 

Ryabkov, Sergei.

“US-Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Current Record and Possible Further Steps: Simons Symposium on European Security and Nuclear Disarmament.”

Berlin, July 01, 2011.
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pic/59/59_documents/PLEN.Ryabkov.pdf

 

Schneider, Mark B.

“Russian Violations of Its Arms Control Obligations.”

Comparative Strategy 31, no. 4 (2012): 331–352.

Abstract:

The Soviet Union and its successor state the Russian Federation have consistently violated their arms control obligations since the beginning of modern arms control in 1972. The violations have involved all major nuclear arms control treaties, including those that limit strategic and theater nuclear arms and constrain nuclear testing. This pattern of behavior is certain to continue. As a result, the nuclear warheads on the Russian missiles apparently will have been tested in contravention of a declared nuclear test moratorium and Russia's legal obligations concerning the CTBT. There is almost never any consequence for these violations. These violations have clear military significance, and they should have an impact upon our views of arms control. Regrettably, they do not. The evidence is more often suppressed than provided to the American people and we continue to ignore it in our arms control policy.

 

Sergei Karaganov.

“Should We Overcome Deterrence?”

Russia in Global Affairs, 22 April 2011.
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Should-We-Overcome-Deterrence-15192

 

Smith, Jeffrey R.

“Obama administration embraces major new nuclear weapons cut: Advisers reach consensus that current arsenals are larger than needed to target foes.”

(8.2.2013).
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/02/08/12156/obama-administration-embraces-major-new-nuclear-weapons-cut

Abstract:

Senior Obama Senior Obama administration officials have agreed that the number of nuclear warheads the U.S. military deploys could be cut by at least a third without harming national security, according to sources involved in the deliberations. They said the officials’ consensus agreement, not yet announced, opens the door to billions of dollars in military savings that might ease the federal deficit and improve prospects for a new arms deal with Russia before the president leaves office. But it is likely to draw fire from conservatives, if previous debate on the issue is any guide.

 

Tertrais, Bruno.

“In Defense of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons.”

Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) 2011.
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/pp39tertrais.pdf

 

The EastWest Institute.

“Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Arsenals.”

Washington, D.C.: The EastWest Institute 2009.
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22775/reframing_dealert.pdf

Abstract:

Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States continue to maintain hundreds of nuclear weapons capable of striking the other side, and to have at least some of these nuclear forces at Cold War levels of alert, that is, ready to fire within a few minutes of receiving an order to do so. Even during the Cold War, alert levels were not static and moved up or down in step with changes in the strategic and tactical environments. While the operational readiness of some weapon systems has been reduced, there has been no major change in the readiness levels of most of the nuclear weapon systems in the post-Cold War era. This is in considerable part because Russia and the United States believe that despite fundamental changes in their overall relationship, vital interest requires maintaining a high level of nuclear deterrence.

 

U.S. Department of Defense.

“Report on tbe Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (U).”

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense 2012.
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/DOD2012_RussianNukes.pdf

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service June, 2013.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43037.pdf

Abstract:

This report reviews the three mechanisms used by the US to reduce its nuclear weapons - formal bilateral treaties; reciprocal but informal understandings; and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. It also looks at the role of nuclear arms control in the US-Soviet relationship and describes the role of Congress in the arms control process. Finally, the report describes issues that Congress may address as the Obama Administration uses these mechanisms to reduce nuclear weapons.

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf

 

Zenko, Micah.

“Toward Deeper Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons.”

Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2010.
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/toward-deeper-reductions-us-russian-nuclear-weapons/p23212

 

Zolotarev, Pavel, Sergei Rogov, Valentin Kuznetsov, and Victor Yesin.

“Russia and the USA at the Crossroads: Obama's Initiatives and Moscow's Reactions.”

Moscow: RIAC 2013.
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2157&from=rbth#top

 

3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

 

 -

“The Future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Options Available.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 19, no. 2 (2013): 67–76.

Abstract:

What is the precise definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)? Should NSNW talks be held in bilateral or multilateral format? What would be more effective? And will the initiatives on NSNW reductions in Europe yield any tangible results? These and other questions have been discussed by: Lt-Gen (Rtd), PIR Center Senior Vice-President, Evgeny Buzhinsky; Senior Research Fellow of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies (Moscow), Anatoly Dyakov; Acting Head of the Main Department for International Military Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Defense, Evgeny Ilyin; PIR Center's Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Coordinator, Alexander Kolbin; Deputy Director for Science and Research at the Institute of Strategic Stability (Moscow), Viktor Koltunov; First Secretary of the Department for Security and Disarmament at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mikhail Kustovsky; PIR Center President, Editor-in-Chief of the Security Index journal, Vladimir Orlov; Advisor to the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Alexander Radchuk; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies (Moscow), Vladimir Rybachenkov.

 

American Physical Society, and CSIS.

“U.S.-Russian Nuclear Reductions After New START: Summary of a Workshop Exploring Next Steps Workshop hosted by the APS Panel on Public Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.”

Washington, D.C.: APS; CSIS 2013.
http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/nuclear-reductions.pdf

 

Andreasen, Steve and Isabelle Williams, eds.

Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action.

Washington, D.C.: NTI, 2011.
http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/uploads/File/NTI_Framework_full_report.pdf

Abstract:

 With NATO members in the midst of a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review—a critical strategic assessment that will help define NATO's future security strategy—a new NTI report proposes a blueprint within NATO and with Russia for moving to a new nuclear posture in Europe. Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action features an essay by former U.S. Senator and NTI Co-Chairman Sam Nunn who writes, "The rationale for maintaining thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for another decade is out of date and dangerous for NATO and for Russia. Getting from where we are today – a dangerous and costly status quo – to where we want to be – the elimination of these weapons – will require a framework for dialogue between NATO and Russia and a clear goal."

 

 Arbatov, Alexei, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds.

NATO-Russia Relations: Prospects for New Security Architecture, Nuclear Reductions, CFE Treaty.

Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN), 2010.
http://www.imemo.ru/en/publ/2010/10001.pdf

 

Arbman, Gunnar, and Charles Thornton.

“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part I: Background and Policy Issues.”

Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency November 2003.
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/7912/1/thorntonrussia.pdf

Abstract:

This is the first part in a series of two on Russia's tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). In this report we provide some background information on Russian TNW and discuss policy issues. Russia's nuclear force structure, including what is openly known about its TNW developments since 1991, is addressed. In particular, the three documents on foreign policy, national security (blueprint), and military doctrine, published in 2000, are analysed with regard to their TNW guidelines. Based on a review of the threats currently facing Russia and how they affect Russia's TNW requirements, we conclude with a section on the implications for Russia’s neighbours and strategic partners. We conclude that Russia is likely to maintain a sizeable fraction of its present TNW arsenal for the foreseeable future as a cost-effective and vital defence component. The main reasons for this conclusion are related to Russian concerns about a future potentially expansionist NATO and, to some extent, China. On the other hand, Russia's problems along its southern front and in Central Asia, while of significant magnitude, are believed to have little, if any, impact on its future reliance on TNW. An exception would be if nuclear proliferation were to occur in the Middle East region combined with rising anti-Russian sentiments among Moslems in the area.

 

Brzoska, Michael, Anne Finger, Oliver Meier, Götz Neuneck, and Wolfgang Zellner.

Prospects for arms control in Europe.

Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/08718.pdf

Abstract:

The complex linkages between conventional and nuclear disarmament as well as plans for missile defenses are the topic of this study. Military disparities between NATO and Russia impede arms control progress. NATO has an advantage over Russia in most military categories. Parity exists on only in the field of strategic nuclear weapons, while Russia has a numerical advantage in holdings of short-range tactical nuclear weapons. The large arsenal of Russian tactical nuclear weapons as well as NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons are hindering disarmament.

 

Chalmers, Hugh, Malcolm Chalmers, and Andrea Berger.

“A Problem Deferred? NATO’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons After Chicago.”

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 2012.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Whitehall_Report_4-12.pdf

 

Chalmers, Malcolm, and Andrew Sommerville.

“If the Bombs Go European. Perspectives on NATO’s Nuclear Debate.”

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 2011.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/IFTHEBOMBSGO.pdf

 

Chalmers, Malcolm, Andrew Somerville, and Andrea Berger.

“Small Nuclear Forces: Five Perspectives.”

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 2013.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Whitehall_Report_3-11.pdf

 

Diakov, Anatoly S.

“Verified Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.”

Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT 2011.
http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/diakov-20110218-verified-reduction-of-nsnw.pdf

Abstract:

U.S. Senate ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty gave new impetus to discussions on the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) into the US-Russia negotiating agenda. In the Senate’s approval resolution of the New Treaty a point was introduced calling the president to undertake efforts to include NSNW in the negotiating agenda with Russia no later then one year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty. Statements of the U.S. officials show that Washington is getting ready for consultations with the Russian side on this issue. However, the Statements by lower house of the Russian parliament accompanying the Federal law on ratification as well as statements by Russian officials indicate that Moscow has no intention to negotiate NSNWs, or at least its position on this issue has not yet been formed.

 

Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI).

“Addressing Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces.”

Washington, D.C.: Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) 2012.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WGP_AddressingNSNW_FINAL.pdf

Abstract:

No issue in the area of European military security is more important or more vexed than that of nonstrategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons. It figures centrally as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weighs a new nuclear deterrence and defence posture. It complicates the issue of conventional arms control and impinges on the next phases of strategic nuclear arms negotiations between the United States and Russia. But Russia and the United States remain not only at loggerheads in their views of the issue, the issue itself has yet to be engaged in active official dialogue or negotiations. The Working Group on Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, rather than pretending to offer a single “right” approach to resolving the issue, instead lays out the many, complex aspects of the problem, and suggests alternative ways that many of these might be addressed were the United States/NATO and Russia to tackle them.

 

Foradori, Paolo.

“Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations.”

The Nonproliferation Review 19, no. 1 (2012): 13–29.

 

Futter, Andrew.

“NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.”

European Security 20, no. 4 (2011): 547–562.

 

Harries, Matthew.

“Britain and France as Nuclear Partners.”

Survival 54, no. 1 (2012): 7–30.

 

Ingram, Paul, and Oliver Meier.

“Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate.”

Washington, D.C; London: ACA; BASIC 2011.
http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Tactical_Nuclear_Report_May_11.pdf

Abstract:

The report, Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate, examines the debate about NATO nuclear policy leading up to the November 2010 Lisbon summit. Several of the authors also analyze the options and issues for the NATO Defense and Deterrence Posture Review, which Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in April would be completed before the next NATO summit in 2012. This review will determine the mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces NATO will need going forward. President Obama has said that he wants tactical nuclear weapons to be included in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms reduction talks, along with strategic weapons and those in storage. The United States and its NATO allies are seeking to encourage Russia to take reciprocal measure to increase transparency related to its relatively larger tactical nuclear weapons stockpile left over from the Cold War.

 

International Security Advisory Board.

“Report on Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Force Reductions.”

Washington, D.C. 2012.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/201403.pdf

 

Kearns, Ian.

“Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States.”

London: BASIC Trident Commission 2011.
http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/commission-briefing1.pdf

Abstract:

This paper presents both data and analysis related to current stockpiles of nuclear weapons held outside the United Kingdom. It examines stockpile numbers, force modernisation trends, declaratory policy and nuclear doctrine, and the security drivers that underpin nuclear weapons possession in each state.

 

Kristensen, Hans M.

“Modernizing NATO’s Nuclear Forces: Implications for the Alliance’s defense posture and arms control.”

Hamburg: ACA, BASIC, IFSH 2012.
http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No11.pdf

Abstract:

NATO’s nuclear posture is scheduled to undergo a significant modernization over the next decade that involves upgrading both the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The modernization will significantly increase the military capabilities of NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe. The modernization plan contradicts key elements of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR).

 

Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris.

“Russian nuclear forces, 2013.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 3 (2013): 71–81.

Abstract:

Russia is in the middle of modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era ballistic missiles with fewer improved missiles. In a decade, almost all Soviet-era weapons will be gone, leaving a smaller but still effective force that will be more mobile than what it replaced. As of early 2013, Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,800 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage, along with 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. There is some uncertainty in these estimates because Russia does not disclose how many nuclear weapons it has and the United States has stopped releasing data supplied by Russia under strategic arms reduction agreements. The authors use public statements made by Russian officials, newspaper articles, observations from commercial satellite images, private conversations with government officials, and analysis of Russian nuclear forces over many years to provide the best available unclassified estimate of Russian nuclear forces.

 

Kulesa, Lukasz.

“The Future of NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture: Views from Central Europe.”

Warsaw: PISM 2012.
http://www.pism.pl/publications/reports/PISM-Report-The-Future-of-NATO-s-Deterrence-and-Defence-Posture-Views-from-Central-Europe#

Abstract:

The year 2012 saw the completion of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), which was mandated by the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon. This process involved a comprehensive re-examination of the utility of the main elements of NATO’s posture: nuclear weapons, missile defence capabilities and conventional forces, as well as arms-control and disarmament issues. Using the DDPR as the point of departure, the report is meant to provide an analytical glimpse into the future—the next decade of the functioning of NATO’s deterrence posture, as seen from Central Europe. It concentrates on the regional perceptions of the security environment and threats, the assessments of the credibility of NATO’s policy, and the way forward. Taken into account the perspective of a turbulent decade in which the viability of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture will be subjected to external and internal pressures, understanding the concerns and viewpoints of Central Europeans would help in charting the right course for the Alliance.

 

Loerke, Benjamin.

“A nuke by any other name.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 May 2012.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/nuke-any-other-name

Abstract:

There is enough ambiguity surrounding the capabilities of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to render the term "tactical" all but useless for arms control purposes. The definitional problem will get worse if the United States follows through with plans to add strategic-use options to its only tactical nuclear bomb. As the United States and Russia pursue new arms control treaties, they should drop the tactical distinction and limit the total number of all nuclear weapons -- strategic, tactical, or other.

 

Meier, Oliver.

“Revising NATO’s Nuclear Posture: The way forward.”

Hamburg: IFSH 2011.
http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No8.pdf

 

Meier, Oliver, and Simon Lunn.

“Trapped: NATO, Russia, And the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons.”

Arms Control Today 44, January/February (2014): 18–24.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_01-02/Trapped-NATO-Russia-and-the-Problem-of-Tactical-Nuclear-Weapons

Abstract:

Strenuous efforts are currently being made to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to reduce existing stockpiles of such weapons. New talks on Iran’s nuclear program have resulted in an interim agreement that could lead to a comprehensive solution of the conflict over how to better control Tehran’s nuclear efforts. The United States and Russia are cooperating in the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, despite competing geopolitical interests in the region. Some hope this cooperation could be the long-awaited “game changer” in relations with Russia, opening the way to progress on the broader agenda of nuclear arms control and other issues. This surge of optimism stands in sharp contrast to the pace of progress on tackling the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO and Russia have entrapped themselves, with each of them linking progress on nuclear arms control to steps by the other side while lacking the political will to take the process forward. The December 3-4 meeting of NATO foreign ministers and deliberations in the NATO-Russia Council did not even have nuclear arms control in Europe on its agenda, although a few member states raised the issue.

 

Nichols, Tom, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland.

“Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.”

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2012.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1103.pdf

 

NTI-GSN.

“U.S. Tactical Nukes in Europe Not Worth the Cost, Watchdog Says.”

Washington, D.C.: NTI-GSN February 3, 2012.
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-maintenance-tactical-nuclear-bombs-europe-too-expensive-watchdog-says/

Abstract:

The increasing cost of maintaining an aging force of U.S. tactical nuclear bombs in Europe is not matched by the defense value the weapons provide, particularly in light of the United States' massive budget problems, a government watchdog said in a Wednesday letter to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (see GSN, Sept. 21, 2011).

 

Primakov, Yevgeny, Igor Ivanov, Yevgeny Velikhov, and Mikhail Moiseev.

“Moving from Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Security.”

Izvestia Daily October 14, 2010.
http://www.abolitionforum.org/site/moving-from-nuclear-deterrence-to-mutual-security/

Abstract:

The time has come to move toward a new stage of disarmament and realize the principal of multilateral actions that will become an important step toward forming a new world order for the 21st century. In such context nuclear arms are rather not an end in itself but one of the principal directions, precondition and a way to reorganize international life on more civilized basis, in literal sense of this meaning and in accordance with the imperatives of our century.

 

Quinlivan, James T., and Olga Oliker.

“Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States.”

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2011.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1075.pdf

Abstract:

This monograph examines how U.S. Air Force strategic forces contribute to and are affected by the evolving relationship with Russia. This study starts with the recognition that the simple numbers and destructive power of both countries’ nuclear arsenals continue to drive at least a baseline requirement to deter the other, even though no adversarial intent exists on either side. In other important ways, however, the interests that the two sides are claiming, protecting, or advancing have changed profoundly from those of the Cold War. The American forces that constituted “deterrence” during the Cold War were matched to a vision of how conflict could come about—primarily in Europe—and how that conflict would be conducted. Changed interests and, thus, changed ways in which interests diverge mean that these visions necessarily no longer hold, although Europe remains a consistent region of concern to both countries. To effectively incorporate deterrence in the context of the current relationship with Russia, in which both sides profess not to see the other as an adversary, we must understand how both Russia and the United States might envision conflict emerging and progressing. The Air Force has always had a special role in understanding the possible use of nuclear weapons in any conflict. This monograph looks at whether and how the possible Russian use of such weapons in the particular context of conflict escalation in a Europe or near-Europe scenario might evolve. If nuclear weapons are employed in the future, they will be employed in different ways from what might have been expected in the past—which means that the mechanisms needed to avert such developments are similarly new. The implications for the Air Force extend beyond those formally charged with the stewardship of nuclear weapons.

 

Rutherford, Ian P.

“NATO's new strategic concept, nuclear weapons, and global zero.”

International Journal 66, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 463–482.
http://www.academia.edu/864094/NATOs_New_Strategic_Concept_Nuclear_Weapons_and_Global_Zero

 

Sauer, Tom, and Bob van der Zwaan.

“US Tactical Nuclear Weapons.”

Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center 2011.
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf

Abstract:

In this paper we describe how, over the past two decades, the usefulness of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that are forward-deployed in Europe has gradually declined, and we explain the logic behind their decreased importance. We then list the main arguments in favor of the continuation of this trend until they are completely eliminated over the next couple of years, while subsequently investigating what the reasons are for NATO's desire to prolong its reliance on these weapons in the future. In the final part of this paper, we analyze the political feasibility of their complete withdrawal, explain what the political practicalities of such a withdrawal would be, and end with several concluding remarks.

 

Schmidt, Helmut, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

“Toward a nuclear-free world: a German view.”

The New York Times January 9, 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/opinion/09iht-edschmidt.1.19226604.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Abstract:

Germany, which has renounced the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, has every reason to call on the nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against countries not possessing such arms. We are also of the opinion that all remaining U.S. nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from German territory. Cooperation, our century's keyword, and secure stability in the northern hemisphere can become milestones on the route to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

 

Seay, Edmond E.

“NATO’s Nuclear Guardians: Why NATO’s bureaucracy is unable to initiate change to, or support reform of, Alliance nuclear policy.”

Hamburg: ACA, BASIC, IFSH May, 2013.
http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/natonuclearguardians2013may.pdf

 

Seay, Edmond E.

“Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the next round of bilateral New START Treaty follow-on talks.”

Hamburg: ACA, BASIC, IFSH 2013. http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No12.pdf

 

Sliwinski, Krzysztof.

“British Nuclear Strategy at the Threshold of the 21st Century.”

European Security 18, no. 1 (2009): 81–97.

 

Smith, Harold, and Raymond Jeanloz.

“Britain Leads the Way To Global Zero.”

Arms Control Today, December 2010, 15–18.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/Smith_ Jeanloz

 

Somerville, Andrew, Ian Kearns, and Malcolm Chalmers.

“Poland, NATO and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe.”

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 2012.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Poland-NATO-and-NSNW-120217.pdf

Abstract:

A debate within NATO about the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe has been revived over the past few years. For a long period, the issue lay dormant, but since 2009 political changes have driven a vigorous debate. Arguments in favour of removing non-strategic nuclear weapons have gained traction in parts of the Alliance, including Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. These weapons, they argue, are outdated and rely on increasingly outmoded forms of delivery. This sentiment chimes with President Obama’s call to address global nuclear dangers, and some in NATO have seen this as an opportunity to take the lead on disarmament. Other NATO member states, however, are apprehensive about unilateral moves towards decommissioning non-strategic nuclear weapons. These include Poland, the Baltic States and the Czech Republic, for whom Russia remains a central security concern. Key policy-makers in France and Turkey are also against such moves.

 

Sutyagin, Igor.

“Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.”

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 2012.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/1211_OP_Atomic_Accounting_Web_updated.pdf

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=735034

Abstract:

This report reviews the three mechanisms used by the US to reduce its nuclear weapons - formal bilateral treaties; reciprocal but informal understandings; and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. It also looks at the role of nuclear arms control in the US-Soviet relationship and describes the role of Congress in the arms control process. Finally, the report describes issues that Congress may address as the Obama Administration uses these mechanisms to reduce nuclear weapons.

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2012.
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=729002

 

Yost, David S.

“The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence.”

International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1401–1438.

Abstract:

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk-and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual-capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non-nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long-standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.

 

Zagorski, Andrei.

“Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics and Arms Control.”

Hamburg: IFSH 2011.
http://www.ifsh.de/pdf/publikationen/hb/hb156.pdf

Abstract:

Should the US and Russia still decide to address TNW in their talks or consultations, they are most likely to do so on a bilateral basis, without involving, at least not at this early stage, any third parties. The political constraints and challenging nature of TNW arms control make a gradualist approach more plausible than anticipating a comprehensive treaty providing for verifiable reductions to be negotiated in the near future. A gradualist approach would depart from making stockpiles, deployment status and, probably, storage locations of TNW more transparent by means of information exchange, while keeping the door open for step-by-step progress in introducing appropriate arms control measures.

 

Zagorski, Andrei.

“Tactical Nuclear Weapons.”

Security and Human Rights 22, no. 4 (2011): 399–409.

Abstract:

Russia and the US have significantly reduced their tactical nuclear weapons over the past twenty years. The remaining weapons have been moved from active service and stored separate from their delivery systems. However, both still keep tactical nuclear weapons available for eventual deployment, and Moscow maintains not only a larger but also a much more diverse stockpile of such weapons than the US. The prospects for designing an arms control regime covering TNW are complicated by a series of factors. Technically, verifying any limitations or reductions of non-deployed weapons is an extremely sensitive and challenging task as it would require opening nuclear depots for inspection. Politically, the two countries differ in the assessment of a future role of nuclear arms. While the US anticipates that further development of its advanced conventional capabilities would lead to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, it is exactly the weakness of its conventional forces which causes the Russian defence establishment to project a growing role for nuclear weapons. These two distinct trajectories largely explain the differences in the two countries' approaches to the TNW arms control and make any agreement less likely to materialize any time soon. They also explain why Moscow has become increasingly sceptical with regard to including TNW within an arms control regime.

 

4. Conventional Precision-Guided Weapons

 

Acton, James M.

“Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike.”

Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2013.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf

Abstract:

The development of non-nuclear weapons that can strike distant targets in a short period of time has been a U.S. goal for more than a decade. Advocates argue that such Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapons could be used to counter antisatellite weapons or sophisticated defensive capabilities; deny a new proliferator the ability to employ its nuclear arsenal; and kill high-value terrorists. Critics worry that CPGS weapons could create serious strategic risks, most notably of escalation—including to the nuclear level—in a conflict. The U.S. Department of Defense has explored a number of CPGS technologies but has yet to decide on a preferred option, let alone acquire or deploy it. While the U.S. Congress has disapproved of particular plans, it has generally agreed with the importance of acquiring the capability. With some CPGS technologies reaching maturity and an acquisition decision approaching, the time is right for a national debate about the benefits and risks of CPGS.

 

Acton, James M.

“Target:?”

Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy May, 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/06/target/ha6r.

Abstract:

The United States has spent $1 billion on a weapon that has no mission and has started an arms race with China in the process.

 

Anin, Anatoly.

“Prompt Global Strike Weapons and Strategic Instability.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 2 (2011): 15–25.

 

Bunn, M. E., and Vincent A. Manzo.

“Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?”

Fort McNair, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies 2011.
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/110201_manzo_sf_263.pdf

 

Fargo, Matthew.

“The Future of Conventional Prompt Global Strike.”

Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2012.
https://csis.org/blog/future-conventional-prompt-global-strike

 

Gormley, Dennis M.

“The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions. Dealing with American Conventional Superiority.”

Paris: IFRI 2009.
http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5575&id_provenance=97

Abstract:

Dennis Gormley analyzes the recent developments in U.S. conventional capabilities that have become key to counter-proliferation policy at a time when nuclear arsenal reductions regain increasing attention. The author gauges the evolution and effectiveness of those programs, examines Russian perceptions of these new capabilities and evaluates the extent to which these perceptions are real or exaggerated. Finally, the paper closes with a set of policy options designed to help allay these concerns on the path toward deep reductions in nuclear arsenals.

 

Long, Austin, Dinshaw Mistry, and Bruce M. Sugden.

“Correspondence: Going Nowhere Fast: Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles.”

International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 166–184.

Abstract:

Austin Long and Dinshaw Mistry respond to Bruce Sugden's summer 2009 International Security article, "Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles."

 

Myasnikov, Eugene.

“Strategic Conventional Arms: Deadlocks and Solutions.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 3 (2011): 9–15.

 

Pollack, Joshua.

“Evaluating conventional prompt global strike.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 1 (2009): 13–20.

 

Sugden, Bruce M.

“Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles.”

International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 113–146.

Abstract:

Should the United States deploy conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) in support of the prompt global strike (PGS) mission? Most important, do the political-military benefits outweigh the risks of CBM deployment? The United States, if it works to mitigate the risk of misperception and an inadvertent nuclear response, should deploy near-term CBMs in support of the PGS mission. The prompt response of CBMs would likely be sufficient to defeat many time-sensitive, soft targets, provided actionable intelligence was available. Near-term CBMs, those options capable of being deployed prior to 2013, would have the required attributes to defeat their targets: payload flexibility, throw weight, and accuracy. More specifically, the U.S. Navy's Conventional Trident Modification is a cost-effective, near-term PGS option that would mitigate the concerns of CBM opponents. The large-scale use of midterm and long-term CBMs against mobile targets and hard and deeply buried targets, however, will require a wider range of technologies that have yet to mature. Thus, the United States should continue investing in research and development for a broad portfolio of PGS options to cover the emerging target set.

 

Thomas, Jim.

“Why the U.S. Army Needs Missiles.”

Foreign Affairs 92, no. 3 (2013): 137–145.

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2013.
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=735886

Abstract:

Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs.

 

5. Conventional Arms Control in Europe

 

Anin, Anatoly, and Rodion Ayumov.

“Conventional Forces in Europe: Yesterday, Today… Tomorrow?…”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 3 (2011): 17–31.

 

Anin, Anatoly, and Rodion Ayumov.

“Conventional Forces in Europe: Yesterday, Today… Tomorrow?… (Part II).”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 17, no. 4 (2011): 15–28.

 

Arbatov, Alexei and Alexandre Kaliadine, eds.

Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security: IMEMO supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2010.

Moscow: IMEMO, 2011.
http://www.imemo.ru/ru/publ/2011/11003.pdf

 

Belobrov, Yuri.

“To Find a Solution to the CFE Crisis.”

International Affairs, A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 55, no. 5 (2009): 21–31.

 

Charap, Samuel.

“The Right Case for European Conventional Arms Control in 2013.”

London: ELN 2013.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-right-case-for-european-conventional-arms-control-in-2013_815.html.

Abstract:

When raising the topic of European conventional arms control (CAC) these days in Washington, one should be prepared for quizzical expressions from interlocutors. With crises in Syria and Iran, the “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific, and Europe’s own pressing economic troubles, the response to expect goes something like this: why bother spending time on this issue? During the New START debate, some commentators even declared nuclear arms control less important than free trade with Central American countries. While that sort of hyperbole is not reflective of the current administration’s views on nuclear arms control, CAC is not nearly as high on the agenda.

 

Collina, Tom Z.

“CFE Treaty Talks Stall.”

Arms Control Today 41, no. 7 (2011): 30–31.
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/4997

 

Drell, Sidney D., and Christopher W. Stubbs.

“Realizing the Full Potential of the Open Skies Treaty.”

Arms Control Today 41, no. 6 (2011): 15–20.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_ 07-08/ Realizing_Full_Potential_Open_Skies_Treaty

 

Durkalec, Jacek, Ian Kearns, and Lukasz Kulesa.

“Starting the Process of Trust-Building in NATO–Russia Relations: The Arms Control Dimension.”

Warsaw: PISM October, 2013.
http://www.pism.pl/publications/PISM-Reports/PISM-ELN-Report-Starting-the-Process-of-Trust-Building-in-NATO-Russia-Relations-The-Arms-Control-Dimension

Abstract:

The spectre of Cold War seems to be coming back to Europe. Russia and Belarus have recently conducted West 2013 exercises, sparking anxieties of its NATO neighbours. NATO itself is in the middle of Steadfast Jazz 2013 exercises testing territorial defence scenarios, which in turn is criticized in Russia. Lack of trust in the NATO-Russia relationship is one of the reasons preventing the two sides from reaching progress on the issues of missile defence in Europe, tactical nuclear weapons or conventional arms control. How to decrease a risk that those differences would lead the two sides to the brink of a new Cold War? A new Report Starting the Process of Trust-Building in NATO–Russia Relations: The Arms Control Dimension by PISM and European Leadership Network argues that a way out of the mutual distrust spiral could be found through a new approach to arms control. Basing on models of trust-building and historical experiences, the report recommends practical measures introducing mutual restraint and increased transparency to conventional and nuclear force postures, as well as missile defense build-up, of NATO and Russia.

 

Kimball, Daryl G.

“Whither the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty?”

Washington, D.C.: ACA November, 2011.
http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/11/22/wither-the-conventional-forces-in-europe-treaty/

 

Kühn, Ulrich.

“From Capitol Hill to Istanbul: The Origins of the Current CFE Deadlock.”

Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research December, 2009. http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/CORE Working Paper 19 %28Kuehn%29.pdf

Abstract:

In December 2007 the most successful and comprehensive international conventional arms control agreement, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), lost the support of its most relevant party – Russia. Moscow’s unilateral decision to suspend the treaty did not actually come as a surprise but merely marked the nadir of negative development that can be traced back to the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit where Russia agreed to withdraw its armed forces from independent Moldova and Georgia. Right up until today NATO States still refuse to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty (ACFE), which was signed in Istanbul, because of Russia’s failure to fully withdraw its forces. Since NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit Declaration these so-called Istanbul Commitments of Russia are the sole justification for the Alliance not moving further in adapting the Cold War-style CFE Treaty to the current European security landscape. The present CORE Working Paper aims at highlighting the origins of the Istanbul Commitments in the U.S. Congress debate of the early and mid-nineties as well as their links to geostrategic and economic interests, structural anti-Russian and anti-arms control resentments within the Republican Party, and a deep mistrust between Capitol Hill and the Clinton Administration around handling NATO enlargement and Russia. The paper will not debate the question of Russia’s policy on the so-called near abroad. To overcome the current deadlock, however, harking back might be helpful in reminding possible future negotiators of the dangers of taking arms control ‘hostage’ to national agendas, which are to some degree confrontational.

 

Kühn, Ulrich.

“CFE: Overcoming the Impasse.”

Russia in Global Affairs 8, no. 2 (2010): 61–70.
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/CFE:_Overcoming_the_Impasse-14892

Abstract:

Russia and the West have lost a great deal of trust in each other, and trust is proving hard to restore, the maintenance of existing arms control regimes such as CFE remains an important political objective, even if the military rationale behind their establishment at the end of the Cold War has largely vanished.

 

Kühn, Ulrich.

“Conventional Arms Control 2.0.”

Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 2 (2013): 189–202.

Abstract:

For more than a decade Europe's once unique arms control acquis is in decline. This pertains foremost to conventional arms control. An assessment of current political North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia problems and military insecurities on the continent shows that a modern approach to conventional arms control could positively contribute to security and stability. In times of financial austerity, a new framework has to focus on mutual military reassurances, transparency, conflict prevention, and the links to nuclear arms control. To achieve such a goal, U.S. leadership, as well as Europeanization of the Reset policy, is needed.

 

Kühn, Ulrich.

“The Relevance of Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control to European Security Today.”

London: European Leadership Network May, 2014. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-relevance-of-nuclear-and-conventional-arms-control-to-european-security-today-by-ulrich-kuhn_1425.html.

Abstract:

With the unlawful annexation of Crimea, relations between the West and Russia have reached a post-Cold War low and European security is back in the headlines. U.S. President Obama’s Prague vision of a world free from nuclear weapons sounds strange and out of place in the current non-cooperative environment. Some might even question its very goal and, therewith, arms control and disarmament policies in general. So – is his vision, and indeed wider efforts at arms control dead long before achieving its ultimate goal?

 

Kühn, Ulrich.

“The Role of Conventional Arms Control in Euro-Atlantic Security: Is It Needed and Is It Achievable?”

London: European Leadership Network September 2013.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-role-of-conventional-arms-control-in-euro-atlantic-security-is-it-needed-and-is-it-achievable_831.html.

Abstract:

Conventional Arms Control in Europe―or to use a rather new acronym, CAC―does not rank very high on national security agendas in the Euro-Atlantic region these days. Other matters of arms control, such as future strategic reductions by the U.S. and Russia, the question of Russian and NATO sub-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and, above all, missile defence―not to mention the Arab Spring, Syria, or the Snowden incident―are much more prominently positioned.

 

Legvold, Robert.

“Reconciling Limitations on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Conventional Arms Control, and Missile Defense Cooperation.” In Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action.

Edited by Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams, 134–51. Washington, D.C.: NTI, 2011.
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Framework_Chpt7.pdf?_=1322702401

 

Lunn, Simon.

“Conventional Arms Control in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Is It Desirable? Is It Achievable?”

London: ELN October, 2013.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/conventional-arms-control-in-the-euro-atlantic-region-is-it-desirable-is-it-achievable_882.html

Abstract:

Simon Lunn explores the prospects for a Conventional Arms Control regime in the Euro-Atlantic Region that reflects the evolution of armed forces since the end of the Cold War, and addresses contemporary security challenges such as frozen conflicts and NATO-Russia tension.

 

McCausland, Jeffrey D.

“The Future of the CFE Treaty: Why It Still Matters.”

Washington, D.C.: East-West Institute June, 2009.
http://www.ewi.info/future-cfe-treaty

 

McCausland, Jeffrey D.

“Op-Ed: Developing A New Approach To Conventional Arms Control.”

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute April 8, 2013.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Developing-A-New-Approach-To-Conventional-Arms-Control/2013/04/08

 

Oznobishchev, Sergei.

“Challenges to Conventional Arms Control in Europe.” In Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security: IMEMO supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2010.

Edited by Alexei Arbatov and Alexandre Kaliadine, 97–107. Moscow: IMEMO, 2011. http://www.imemo.ru/ru/publ/2011/11003.pdf

 

Schmidt, Hans-Joachim.

Verified transparency: New conceptual ideas for conventional arms control in Europe.

Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Inst. Frankfurt (PRIF), 2013.
http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif119.pdf

Abstract:

Conventional arms control in Europe has reached a crossroads. If the modernization of the legally binding CFE Treaty and the politically binding Vienna Document fails, the treaties will likely fade away in the next few years. Hans-Joachim Schmidt points out the merits of conventional arms control, analyzes the current crisis and proposes a series of concrete instruments and measures for its modernization. He argues the importance of conventional arms control for security cooperation in the future, as it could reestablish confidence and strengthen the OSCE. Even the ambitious aim of global Nuclear Zero would have no chance of being realized for the time being with the loss of the arms control instrument.

 

Schmidt, Hans-Joachim, and Wolfgang Zellner.

“Confidence- and security-building measures.” In SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

Edited by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 447–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

 

Schmidt, Hans-Joachim, and Wolfgang Zellner.

“Limiting conventional arms to promote military security: the case of conventional arms control in Europe.” In SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

Edited by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 442–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

 

Schulte, Paul.

“The Precarious State of Flux of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE): Conference Paper.”

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Council June 2, 2011.
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0106.html

 

Spitzer, Hartwig.

“Open Skies in turbulence, a well functioning treaty is endangered by outside developments.”

Security and Human Rights 22, no. 4 (2011): 373–382.

 

Witkowsky, Anne, Sherman Garnett, and Jeffrey D. McCausland.

“Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington.”

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution March, 2010.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_armed_forces_europe_treaty/03_armed_forces_europe_treaty.pdf

 

Zellner, Wolfgang.

“Can This Treaty Be Saved? Breaking the Stalemate on Conventional Forces in Europe.”

Arms Control Today 39, no. 7 (2009): 12–18.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_09/Zellner

 

Zellner, Wolfgang.

“Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Is There a Last Chance?”

Arms Control Today 42, no. 2 (2012): 14–18.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_03/Conventional_Arms_Control_in_Europe_Is_There_a_Last_Chance

 

Zellner, Wolfgang, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, and Götz Neuneck, eds.

The future of conventional arms control in Europe.

Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges., 2009.

 

6. Transparency and Verification

 

Acton, James M.

“Beyond Treaties: Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.”

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/beyond_treaties.pdf

 

Anderson, Brian, Hugh Beach, John Finney, and Nick Ritchie.

“Verification of Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement: Peer Review of the UK MoD Programme.”

London: British Pugwash Group 2012.
http://www.britishpugwash.org/documents/BPG Verification Report.pdf

 

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences.

Monitoring nuclear weapons and nuclear-explosive materials.

Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005.

Abstract:

In this study, CISAC tackles the technical dimensions of a longstanding controversy: To what extent could existing and plausibly attainable measures for transparency and monitoring make possible the verification of all nuclear weapons strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed plus the nuclear-explosive components and materials that are their essential ingredients? The committee's assessment of the technical and organizational possibilities suggests a more optimistic conclusion than most of those concerned with these issues might have expected.

 

Diakov, Anatoly S.

“Verified Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.”

Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT 2011.
http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/diakov-20110218-verified-reduction-of-nsnw.pdf

Abstract:

U.S. Senate ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty gave new impetus to discussions on the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) into the US-Russia negotiating agenda. In the Senate’s approval resolution of the New Treaty a point was introduced calling the president to undertake efforts to include NSNW in the negotiating agenda with Russia no later then one year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty. Statements of the U.S. officials show that Washington is getting ready for consultations with the Russian side on this issue. However, the Statements by lower house of the Russian parliament accompanying the Federal law on ratification as well as statements by Russian officials indicate that Moscow has no intention to negotiate NSNWs, or at least its position on this issue has not yet been formed.

 

Findlay, Trevor.

“Verification of a nuclear weapon-free world.”

London: VERTIC 2003.
http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/BP1_Findlay.pdf

Abstract:

The verifi cation and compliance regime for a nuclear weapon-free world will need to be more eff ective than any disarmament arrangement hitherto envisaged. One hundred per cent verifi cation of compliance with any international arms agreement is highly improbable. In the case of nuclear disarmament, however, the security stakes will be so high that states will not agree to disarm and to disavow future acquisition of nuclear weapons unless verifi cation reduces to a minimum the risk of non-compliance.

 

James Fuller.

“Verification on the Road to Zero: Issues for Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement.”

Arms Control Today, December 2010, 19–27.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/ Fuller

 

Kubiak, Katarzyna.

“NATO and Russia experiences with nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures: Background paper for the workshop “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice” SWP, Berlin, 27–28 March 2014.”

Berlin: SWP April, 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/wp_kubiak_April2014.pdf.

Abstract:

TCBMs are on the NRC agenda and have been agreed and implemented between Russia and the United States. The Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, provides the current political framework for engaging Moscow in talks on TCBMs. Allies lament Russia’s lack of transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons and state that “in any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.”

 

Mutschler, Max.

“Lessons learned from past experiences with transparency and confidence-building measures: Background paper for the workshop “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice” SWP, Berlin, 27-28 March 2014.”

Berlin: SWP April, 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/wp_Mutschler_April2014fin.pdf.

Abstract:

This paper builds on the definition reached by all members of the NATO-Russia Council in 2011. Transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) are understood here as cooperative measures that aim to increase transparency and trust between states. They are intended to reassure potential adversaries of their non-aggressive intentions and to reduce the risk of misperception of certain activities. Two types of TCBMs are frequently distinguished in the literature: transparency measures and actions imposing military constraint on parties.

 

Patton, Tamara, Pavel Podvig, and Phillip Schell.

“A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament: Individual Country Reports.”

New York, N.Y; Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 2013.
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-new-start-model-for-transparency-in-nuclear-disarmament-individual-country-reports-en-415.pdf

 

Pilat, Joseph F., and Nathan E. Busch.

“WMD Monitoring and Verification Regimes: Lessons from Iraq.”

Contemporary Security Policy 32, no. 2 (2011): 401–431.

 

Scheffran, Jürgen.

“Verification and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world: elements and framework of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.”

Disarmament Forum 3 (2010): 51–64.
http://www.einiras.org/pub/details.cfm?lng=en&id=123095

Abstract:

In this article, the author argues that it is now an appropriate time to think about how a Nuclear Weapons Convention could be structured, implemented and, in particular, verified. Such a comprehensive agreement will only be effective if it enhances global security and can be adequately verified.

 

Schneider, Mark B.

“Russian Violations of Its Arms Control Obligations.”

Comparative Strategy 31, no. 4 (2012): 331–352.

Abstract:

The Soviet Union and its successor state the Russian Federation have consistently violated their arms control obligations since the beginning of modern arms control in 1972. The violations have involved all major nuclear arms control treaties, including those that limit strategic and theater nuclear arms and constrain nuclear testing. This pattern of behavior is certain to continue. As a result, the nuclear warheads on the Russian missiles apparently will have been tested in contravention of a declared nuclear test moratorium and Russia's legal obligations concerning the CTBT. There is almost never any consequence for these violations. These violations have clear military significance, and they should have an impact upon our views of arms control. Regrettably, they do not. The evidence is more often suppressed than provided to the American people and we continue to ignore it in our arms control policy.

 

Woolf, Amy F.

“Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control.”

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2011.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41201.pdf

 

7. Nuclear Doctrines

 

Arbatov, Alexei.

“Common Sense and Disarmament. The Matter and Philosophy of Nuclear Weapons.”

Russia in Global Affairs, 2010.
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Common-Sense-and-Disarmament-15006

Abstract:

The role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the status and security of the Russian Federation seems to be over-exaggerated. It was the over-reliance on the nuclear potential (and military might in general) that finally ruined the Soviet Union, as it deprived it of an incentive to carry out a profound political and economic modernization. Russia must not repeat that mistake of relying too much on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security and international prestige.

 

Arbatov, Alexei, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Sergey Oznobishchev.

“Contemporary Nuclear Doctrines.”

Moscow: IMEMO 2010.
http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/uploads/publications/CONTEMPORARYNUCLEARDOCTRINES_102110.pdf

Abstract:

The publication includes a systematic classification of nuclear doctrines in terms of using nuclear weapons for a retaliatory (second) strike following a nuclear attack by the adversary. In addition, the states are estimated and ranked with respect to their preparedness to use nuclear weapons in a first strike.

 

Blair, Bruce, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev.

“One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses.”

Science & Global Security 19, no. 3 (2011): 167–194.
http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs19blair.pdf

Abstract:

Nuclear exchange models using Monte Carlo methods were used to test the stability of U.S.-Russian deterrence for reduced nuclear force sizes off alert in the presence of missile defenses. For this study U.S. and Russian weapons were partitioned into a postulated First Echelon, consisting of single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be generated in hours to launch-ready status, and into a postulated Second Echelon of more diverse nuclear forces including multiple-warhead, road-mobile and sea-based systems that require days to weeks to become launch ready. Given reasonable estimates of weapons characteristics, First Echelon nuclear forces can survive to retaliate in numbers that satisfy the requirements of deterrence, given limitations on the numbers of missile defense interceptors, a result which is bolstered by the added capabilities of the more deeply de-alerted Second Echelon.

 

Blair, Bruce, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev.

“Smaller and Safer: A New Plan for Nuclear Postures.”

Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (2010): 9–16.

 

Boulware, Jeffrey C.

“The Impact of Emerging Technology on the U.S. Nuclear Triad.”

Washington, D.C., pp. 67-93: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2012.
http://csis.org/files/publication/121017_Spies_NuclearInitiative_Web.pdf

Abstract:

Treaty agreements limit the development of new weapon systems in the nuclear triad and their carrier vehicles; however, this does not prohibit the United States from integrating new technology into its post–Cold War nuclear mission. Research into nuclear forensics, enrichment, and modeling and simulation has garnered much attention, but the bounds of science and technology are far more vast. The intent of this project is to examine various aspects of emerging technology, what their role could be in the nuclear triad, and their impact on political, fiscal, and strategic concerns.

 

Cartwright, James, Thomas D'agostino, Robert Einhorn, and Bradley Roberts.

“Nuclear Posture Review.”

Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/council_on_foreign_relation.pdf

 

Delpech, Thérèse.

“Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: Lessons from the Cold War for a new era of strategic piracy.”

Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2012.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1103.html

Abstract:

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. In this book, Thérèse Delpech calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of the traditional concepts of first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War–era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers (e.g., China), smaller nuclear powers (e.g., Pakistan and North Korea), and nonstate actors (e.g., terrorists), as well as the extension of defense and security analysis to new domains, such as outer space and cyberspace. The author draws upon the lessons of the bipolar Cold War era to illustrate new concepts of deterrence that properly account for the variety of nuclear actors, the proliferation of missiles and thermonuclear weapons, and the radical ideologies that all are part of the nuclear scene today.

 

Ford, Christopher, and Thomas Graham.

“Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: The American Way.”

Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security 19, no. 1 (2013): 51–64.

 

Friedman, Benjamin, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay.

“The End of Overkill? Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.”

Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute 2013.
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/end-overkill-reassessing-us-nuclear-weapons-policy

Abstract:

US security does not require nearly 1,600 nuclear weapons deployed on a triad of systems—bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—to deliver them. A smaller arsenal deployed entirely on submarines would save roughly $20 billion annually while deterring attacks on the United States and its allies. A missile dyad is more politically feasible but saves less.

 

Gerson, Michael S.

“No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy.”

International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 7–47.
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018

 

Kristensen, Hans M., and Matthew McKinzie.

“Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons.”

Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 2012.
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-012-M-en.pdf

 

Larsen, Jeffrey A, Justin V. Anderson, Darci Bloyer, Thomas Devine, Rebecca D. Gibbons, and Christina Vaughan.

“Qualitative Considerations of Nuclear Forces at Lower Numbers and Implications for Future Arms Control Negotiations.” Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies 2012. http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP68.pdf

 

Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press.

“The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent.”
http://www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Lieber-Press.pdf

Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009): 39–51.

Abstract:

The success of nuclear deterrence may turn out to be its own undoing. Nuclear weapons helped keep the peace in Europe throughout the Cold War, preventing the bitter dispute from engulfing the continent in another catastrophic conflict. But after nearly 65 years without a major war or a nuclear attack, many prominent statesmen, scholars, and analysts have begun to take deterrence for granted.They are now calling for a major drawdown of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and a new commitment to pursue a world without these weapons.

 

Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press.

“The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy.”

Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 42–54.
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dpress/docs/Press_Rise_US_Nuclear_Primacy_FA.pdf

 

Meyer, Paul.

“Policy or posturing: The US nuclear posture review in an international context.”

International Journal, Summer 2011, 663–676.
http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/all/files/Policy or posturing-the US nuclear posture review in an international context from CIC%27s International Journal.pdf

 

Murdock, Clark A., Stephanie Spies, and John Warden.

Forging a Consensus for a Sustainable U.S. Nuclear Posture.

CSIS Reports. Lanham: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group Inc, 2013.
http://csis.org/files/publication/130422_Spies_ForgingConsensus_Web.pdf

Abstract:

This report was produced by the CSIS Nuclear Consensus Working Group (NCWG) to assist the Obama administration in forging, during its second term, an enduring consensus about the U.S. nuclear posture. The report includes (1) seven individual statements from nuclear thinkers and practitioners across the “broad middle” of the spectrum of opinion on the role and value of U.S. nuclear weapons, the U.S. nuclear posture needed for this defined role, and a political strategy for sustaining the recommended posture; (2) a consensus statement signed by eight members of the NCWG; (3) A description of the process used by the NCWG to forge the signed statement, which includes the lessons learned from the facilitation process; and (4) A case study covering 2008-2012, which provides both a chronology of past attempts to broker consensus about the U.S. nuclear posture and the working group’s assessment of the lessons learned.

 

Oelrich, Ivan.

“The next step in arms control: Eliminate the counterforce mission.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 1 (2012): 79–85.

 

Perkovich, George.

Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine.

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/do_unto_others.pdf

Abstract:

The debate surrounding U.S. nuclear policy focuses too narrowly on reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the American arsenal toward zero. More important is preventing the use of nuclear weapons in whatever numbers they exist. President Barack Obama should articulate a narrowed framework for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons that the United States believes would be defensible for others to follow as long as nuclear weapons remain.

 

Rumbaugh, Russell, and Nathan Cohn.

“Resolving Ambiguity: Costing Nuclear Weapons.”

Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center 2012.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/RESOLVING_FP_4_no_crop_marks.pdf

Abstract:

As the defense budget comes under increasing pressure, many have suggested nuclear weapons as an area for savings. But estimates of what the United States spends on nuclear weapons widely vary. This report provides an estimate of US spending on nuclear weapons that resolves most of the ambiguity created by that variance. It makes two key contributions to the debate about nuclear weapons spending and nuclear weapons policy. First, it clarifies there are few disagreements about the costs of particular components of the nuclear enterprise—which are usually based on official accounts. Instead, most of the ambiguity stems from disagreements about what should be included as nuclear costs under the broad umbrella of costs associated with or related to nuclear weapons. This report reviews official estimates and independent studies, and then arrays these in a like manner to demonstrate most disagreement is definitional.

 

Secretary of Defense of the United States.

“Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States: Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.”

Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense 2013.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf

 

Tertrais, Bruno.

“In Defense of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons.”

Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) 2011.http://www.ifri.org/downloads/pp39tertrais.pdf

 

The EastWest Institute.

“Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Arsenals.”

Washington, D.C.: The EastWest Institute 2009.
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22775/reframing_dealert.pdf

Abstract:

Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States continue to maintain hundreds of nuclear weapons capable of striking the other side, and to have at least some of these nuclear forces at Cold War levels of alert, that is, ready to fire within a few minutes of receiving an order to do so. Even during the Cold War, alert levels were not static and moved up or down in step with changes in the strategic and tactical environments. While the operational readiness of some weapon systems has been reduced, there has been no major change in the readiness levels of most of the nuclear weapon systems in the post-Cold War era. This is in considerable part because Russia and the United States believe that despite fundamental changes in their overall relationship, vital interest requires maintaining a high level of nuclear deterrence.

 

“Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship.”

Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies 2013.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23432/transcending_mutual_deterrence_in_the_usrussian_relationship.html.

Abstract:

Nuclear weapons issues continue to figure prominently on the bilateral agenda between the United States and Russia. Although the U.S.-Russia relationship is no longer characterized by the hostility of the Cold War years, mutual nuclear deterrence continues to underpin the relationship between the two countries. Is mutual deterrence a permanent fixture of the relationship between Washington and Moscow, or can they move beyond it?

 

U.S. Department of Defense.

“Nuclear Posture Review Report.”

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010 nuclear posture review report.pdf

 

Wood Forsyth Jr., James, B. C. Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr.

“Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons.”

Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2010): 74–89.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/spring/forsythsaltzmanschaub.pdf.

 

8. Global Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

 

“The Future of Arms Control.”

Publication Series on Democracy 37, Berlin 2014.
http://www.boell.de/en/2014/03/27/future-arms-control.

Abstract:

The escalation of the armed conflict in Syria has been a painful reminder of the need to strengthen arms control and non-proliferation efforts. The European perspective on arms control is still shaped by the experiences of the Cold War. In other regions, different experiences and priorities shape existing arms control approaches: For example, the rise of China and the ambitions of old-new powers such as India, Iran, and Brazil are changing the global security equilibrium. The emergence of a multipolar world order is another strong argument in favor of a multilateral architecture of arms control and col-lective security. This publication is an opportunity to figure out what steps should be taken to strengthen cooperative efforts in controlling and reducing military capabilities.