Deep Cuts Working Paper #7

Abstract

During the second term of the Obama administration, U.S.-Russia relations have deteriorated to levels not seen since the Cold War. Navigating this period of tension requires a renewed dedication to the idea of strategic arms control and new concepts that can deal with new challenges. The United States and Russia should seek a treaty that does not only limit existing strategic forces but also the weapons systems that both countries plan to develop and deploy in the next decade. In this way, each side could hope to control the most threatening systems that they face, avoid unnecessary expenditures, and present a more compelling case to their domestic audiences about the value of arms control.

This paper by Adam Mount discusses another approach to strategic nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia and offers concrete recommendations on how to stabilize the bilateral relationship while at the same time striking an agreement which could promote stability well into the 21st century.

 

About the Author

Adam Mount is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Previously, he was a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Before that, he worked at the RAND Corporation.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #8

Abstract

With NATO's Warsaw Summit fast approaching, the question of how to reassure NATO's easternmost allies while at the same time not further straining relations with Russia becomes key. Since 2014, particularly the Baltic States and Poland have called on NATO to further strengthen their defensive capabilities against what they perceive as a threatening Russian foreign and security policy. While proponents of beefing up NATO's deterrence capabilities are currently dominating the debate, measures from the realm of arms control are seldomly discussed. However, as this paper proves, sub-regional restraint measures and enhanced transparency in the conventional realm could as well contribute to strengthening the security of all states in the Baltic area.

This paper assesses the current mutual threat perceptions by NATO, in particular the Baltic States and the Eastern European allies, and the Russian Federation. With a particular view to the Baltic region, it analyzes the respective force postures assesses the plausibility of mutual scenarios, and gives concrete recommendations in the realm of possible arms control agreements and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).

 

Wolfgang Richter

About the Author

Wolfgang Richter (Colonel ret.) is Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics. He served for many years in various German delegations to, inter alia, the United Nations and the OSCE.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #9

Abstract

The inauguration of Donald Trump as 45th president of the United States has shaken the assumptions usually made about the overall continuity of American foreign policy. Although never mentioned as part of his “Day One” list of priorities, President Trump will soon be forced by circumstances to formulate a policy with regard to disputes over compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. How he handles the issue will affect his ability to follow through on his stated willingness to make deals with Russian President Putin on a host of issues, because arms control skeptics in the U.S. Congress are likely to prevent ratification of any agreement that leaves INF Treaty compliance unresolved.

This paper assesses the challenges to and opportunities of INF Treaty compliance in the light of newer political developments. It analyzes the current state of treaty compliance with particular view to Russian and US-American perceptions and gives concrete recommondations regarding a sustainable positive development of the INF Treaty.

 

Wolfgang Richter

About the Authors

Greg Thielmann is a member of the Arms Control Association’s Board of Directors, and previously served as an office director in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, a professional staff member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and as a senior fellow at ACA.



 

 

Andrei Zagorski is Director of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Regulation, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences and Professor of International Relations, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University).

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #10

Abstract

The current tensions in the relationship between NATO and Russia are at their highest point since the end of the Cold War. The causes and symptoms of these tensions are multifaceted. There is an urgent need for the United States and Russia to pull their relationship back from the brink. An early agenda for bilateral engagement should focus on options to reduce the risks of unintended conflict, lessen incentives for escalation, including to the possible use of nuclear weapons, reinforce existing arms control mechanisms, and eliminate obstacles to new risk-reduction initiatives. In addition, the United States should be prepared to right-size U.S. nuclear forces to the lowest level necessary to meet deterrence requirements, which could put pressure on Russia to follow suit. This jointly elaborated Working Paper, written by Kingston Reif and Victor Mizin (with assistance of Maggie Tennis), assesses the state of the current NATO-Russia relationship, examines the bilateral arms control relationship and prospects for future progress, proposes options to reduce the risks of conflict between NATO and Russia, and strengthen strategic stability, and lastly makes the case for unilaterally adjusting the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and responds to arguments against such an adjustment.

 

Wolfgang Richter

About the Authors

Kingston Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, where his work focuses on nuclear disarmament, preventing nuclear terrorism, missile defense, and the defense budget. He is also an expert on the legislative process and closely monitors Congressional action on these issues.

 

Victor Mizin is Senior Research Fellow with the Center of International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Prior to this position, he has been Deputy Director of the Institute for International Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs University (MGIMO). He participated as an adviser in armscontrol negotiations, including START I and START II, the INF Treaty, the Conference on Disarmament, and the UN Disarmament Commission.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #11

Abstract

The European security order as agreed upon in the 1990s has eroded dramatically. The objective of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to create a common European space of cooperative security without dividing lines has been replaced by new geopolitical zero-sum games, deep rifts, military interventions and protracted conflicts. Conventional arms control lies in ruins and the OSCE Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) are insufficient to stabilize the situation and dispel new threat perceptions. These developments started long before the Ukraine conflict triggered the second nadir in NATO-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. In his latest Deep Cuts Working Paper, Wolfgang Richter elaborates the stabilizing role of conventional arms control regarding the return to security cooperation in Europe.

 

Wolfgang Richter

About the Author

Wolfgang Richter (Colonel ret.) is Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics. He served for many years in various German delegations to, inter alia, the United Nations and the OSCE.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #6

Abstract

Since Barack Obama’s start of the U.S. presidency, America faces a conundrum: how can the United States at once reassure its allies and partners by demonstrating the potency of its unrivalled conventional superiority without unsetting the very strategic stability it asserts is so central to achieving the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world? In particular, there are a number of impediments standing in the way of adequately addressing America’s conventional advantages vis-à-vis Russia and China. Above all, it has always been a sacrosanct principle of U.S. strategic planning that the United States will pursue achieving and maintaining technological superiority.

This paper by Dennis M. Gormley addresses the difficult question of how missile defense and conventional precision-guided weapons complicate achieving deep cuts in nuclear weapons - particularly with a view to the strategic relationships to Russia and China.

 

About the Author

Dennis M. Gormley is a Senior Lecturer at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh and served for ten years in the U.S. intelligence community.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #5

Abstract

The lack of serious engagement on behalf of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to eliminate their nuclear weapons, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), however, is more and more being criticized by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Their patience is running out of steam, and, crucially, they have found leverage in the form of the so-called humanitarian initiative, including the prospect of banning nuclear weapons. The upcoming five-yearly NPT Review Conference - from 27 April to 22 May 2015 in New York - will be a test of the strength of the humanitarian initiative as well as an indication whether the NWS have understood the message.

This paper by Tom Sauer wants to find out to what extent the NPT and the humanitarian initiative are complimentary, and aims to assess this new narrative in view of the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference.

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About the Author

Tom Sauer is Associate Professor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen (Belgium) and a member of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #4

Abstract

In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort – the Trilateral Initiative – aimed at investigating the feasibility and requirements for a verification system under which the IAEA could accept and monitor nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components pursuant to the NPT Article VI commitments of both States. Although the Initiative ended in 2002, the Model Verification Agreement produced could still serve as the basis for bilateral or multilateral agreements between the IAEA and nuclear-weapon States.

In this paper, Thomas E. Shea and Laura Rockwood examine the potential role for international verification of fissile material in relation to nuclear disarmament, what was accomplished under the Trilateral Initiative and, more importantly, what should be done now to preserve its legacy and take concrete steps towards such verification.

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About the Authors

Thomas E. Shea served for 24 years in the IAEA Department of Safeguards and headed the IAEA Trilateral Initiative Office from its creation until his departure from the IAEA at the end of 2003. Shea also headed the IAEA FMCT working group, and headed a study group that analyzed the CTBT before it was completed.

 

Laura Rockwood was Section Head for Non-Proliferation and Policy Making in the Office of Legal Affairs of the International Atomic Energy Agency until 2013. She was involved in all aspects of the negotiation, interpretation and implementation of IAEA safeguards, and was the principal author of the document that became the Model Additional Protocol.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #2

Abstract

The 'P5' meetings produced a forum for interesting discussions and constructive general documents, but failed to achieve the principal stated goal: engagement of third nuclear weapon states in the process of nuclear arms limitations and reductions. It looks like there is no prospect of reaching this goal in the future for reasons beside the negative political environment, brought by the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014. Even in case of political resolution of the current crisis and improved international environment, the 'P5' format does not seem promising for the task assigned to it.

In his paper, Alexey Arbatov analyzes the origins and achievements of the 'P5' process, questions the basic assumptions underlying the process, assesses the chances for engaging Britain, France, and China in nuclear reductions, and gives a number of recommendations for enhancing the process.

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About the Author

Alexey Arbatov is the Head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and a scholar in residence with the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program.

 
Deep Cuts Working Paper #2

Abstract

Over the past half-century, the world has gained a great deal of experience with the verification of arms control agreements. With a few notable exceptions, these efforts have been successful. In addition, capabilities to carry out monitoring and verification have improved substantially. Nevertheless, emerging new and more difficult arms control goals, such as further reducing U.S. and Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear  weapons, will require more innovative and intrusive techniques and lessons can be learned from a number of arms control agreements.

In this paper, Edward M. Ifft summarizes the lessons learnt from the verification of arms control agreements and links them to the goal of deep nuclear reductions. Special emphasis is placed on the New START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation.

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About the Author

Edward M. Ifft has served on U.S. delegations to the SALT, TTBT, START and CTBT negotiations, was the Senior State Representative to both the START and CTBT negotiations, and served as Deputy U.S. Negotiator to START.

Deep Cuts Working Paper #1

Abstract

The United States and Russia have made major reductions in their long-range nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War. These reductions should be welcome, but are less than one might expect and hope for, given that the Cold War is over. The recent New START treaty calls for a modest additional reduction for the nuclear superpowers, but leaves the two arsenals with essentially the same Cold War structure on a smaller scale. Truly significant further reductions in numbers and nuclear dangers will require a new attitude toward the role of nuclear weapons.

In his paper, Ivan Oelrich focuses on three aspects of U.S. strategic forces: first their current status, then the doctrine and policy that guide their potential use, plans for the next generation of weapons, and finally, some recommendations about what is required to move toward deep reductions in nuclear forces.

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About the Author

Ivan Oelrich is an independent analyst. He has been an adjunct professor at Princeton University, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Hamburg, and now The George Washington University.