Am 24.01. erschien im Rahmen der Sendung "Streitkräfte und Strategien" von NDR Info ein Interview mit Ulrich Kühn zu den Ursachen und Auswirkungen des aktuellen Rüstungskontroll-Stillstands. Darin erläuterte Commissioner Kühn die momentane Lage um den New START Vertrag, die Krise des INF-Vertrags und die Auswirkungen von Raketenabwehr und Prompt Global Strike. Mehrfach bezog sich Kühn auf die Arbeit der "Deep Cuts" Kommission und deren 1. Bericht vom April 2014. Click here...

The 'P5' meetings produced a forum for interesting discussions and constructive general documents, but failed to achieve the principal stated goal: engagement of third nuclear weapon states in the process of nuclear arms limitations and reductions. It looks like there is no prospect of reaching this goal in the future for reasons beside the negative political environment, brought by the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014. Even in case of political resolution of the current crisis and improved international environment, the 'P5' format does not seem promising for the task assigned to it.

In this new Deep Cuts Working Paper, Russian researcher Alexey Arbatov analyzes the origins and achievements of the 'P5' process, questions the basic assumptions underlying the process, assesses the chances for engaging Britain, France, and China in nuclear reductions, and gives a number of recommendations for enhancing the process. Click here

In his latest comment for the ELN, Commissioner Pifer argues that "The key to a negotiated settlement may well turn on the ability of the European Union and United States to persuade Mr. Putin and the Kremlin that sanctions will stay on until there is a genuine change in Moscow’s approach and Russia becomes part of the solution, not the core of the problem." Click here

In a most recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Deep Cuts Commissioner Miasnikov takes on the issue of "Modernization and “zero”: Compatible tendencies?" According to the article, "Most nuclear weapon states, including the United States and Russia, have often declared their commitment to getting rid of nuclear weapons. But no nuclear weapon state will feel ready to abandon its nuclear capabilities unless all other nations do likewise. Nuclear arms are therefore likely to remain in military arsenals for a long time and nuclear weapons will continue to be refurbished. But even if one accepts as inevitable the modernizations of nuclear arsenals, can they be managed in such a way that they don't create obstacles to nuclear arms reductions and to complete disarmament in the long run?" Click here

This new Deep Cuts Issue Brief by Russian researcher Victor Mizin assesses the state of the West-Russian Security Dialogue and the prospects for further nuclear arms control in the near to me-term future. In addition, Mizin suggests a number of possible measures to achieve more stability for the strained relationship. Click here

'It has been obvious for decades that advances in strategic ballistic missile defenses can complicate efforts to maintain a balance in strategic offensive forces while reducing overall nuclear arsenals,' says Deep Cuts Commissioner Greg Thielmann is his blog post for the Arms Control Association. According to Thielmann, 'the two Cold War superpowers addressed this problem by negotiating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, which limited the breadth and scope of ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployments. But U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and enthusiastic pursuit of BMD by the United States has again brought the negative impact of missile defense on nuclear arms control efforts to the fore.' Click here

From December 12-13, Deep Cuts Commissioners met for their second workshop in the city of Hamburg. The meeting took place at the facilities of the Hamburg DESY. This time, Commissioners were supported in their deliberations by Friends of the Commission Antje Leendertse, Anya Loukianova, Dingli Shen, Matthew Harries, Bernard Norlain, Michael Schmunk, Laura Rockwood, and Thomas Shea. The two-days discussions focused on the current Ukraine conflict and its consequences for arms control and disarmament efforts, the INF debate, the lagacy of the IAEA's Trilateral Initiative, the upcoming 2015 NPT RevCon, and further multilateral steps in the P5 process.

On the evening of December 12, workshop participants received an invitation by Councillor of State, Pelikahn to the Hamburg Rathaus, followed by an address by former First Mayor of Hamburg, Klaus von Dohnanyi and Member of the German Bundestag, Niels Annen.

At the end of the two days, participants agreed on the elaboration of a second report by the Deep Cuts Commission addressing the current obstacles to nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament.

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Conventional Arms Control has been in a state of deadlock long before the Ukraine conflict, argues Commissioner Ulrich Kühn. The Ukraine conflict shows an increased need for more military transparency, predictability, and trust. Conventional Arms Control could address these issues; however, since it is plagued by crisis itself it currently cannot fulfill this role. Conventional Arms Control is based on the idea of cooperative security. Cooperative security is based on a defensively-oriented concept which combines questions of morality and power. The U.S. and Russian security policies during the last 20 years did – partially – not live up to this goal. Click here...