A new report outlining new approaches to Conventional Arms Control (CAC) in Europe has just been published by IFSH Hamburg. Contributors include, amongst others, Deep Cuts Commissioners Wolfgang Zellner (Germany) and Andrei Zagorski (Russia). The report is based on an international workshop which took place in Berlin in April 2015 and which sought to encourage international security experts to focus again on future frameworks for a CAC approach. As the report states: "the war in Ukraine has created a new sense of urgency about conventional arms control in Europe." Click here ...


In his latest analysis for "War On The Rocks", Deep Cuts Commissioner Ulrich Kühn takes on the ambivalent relationship of Germany towards NATO. Against the background of the Ukraine crisis, Germany might face a number of difficult decisions in the future, argues Kühn. Particularly the future nuclear posture of NATO and latest calls by American experts for strengthening U.S. nuclear deterrence commitments in Europe could help to undermine alliance solidarity. Click here ...

In his latest paper for the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Deep Cuts Commissioner Götz Neuneck takes on the issue of nuclear disarmament verification. The paper argues: "A number of scientific-technical activities have been carried out to establish more robust and irreversible disarmament verification schemes. Regardless of the actual path towards deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals or their total elimination in the future, disarmament verification will require new verification procedures and techniques. This paper discusses the information that would be required as a basis for building confidence in disarmament, how it could be principally verified and the role Europe could play." Click here ...

In his most recent blog post for the "Order from Chaos" blog of the Brookings Institution, Deep Cuts Commissioner Steven Pifer argues for a balanced mix of toughness and cooperation with Russia. According to Pifer, "we should not fear negotiating with the Russians, but we also should not cite a Cold War strawman to frighten ourselves into a negotiation or unwise concessions." [...] "Washington and Moscow cannot negotiate over the heads of Ukraine or other Europeans—those countries need to be subjects, not just objects, of the negotiation. Otherwise, we risk an unhappy lot who could frustrate implementation of any arrangement." Click here ...

In his latest blog post for the Arms Control Association, Deep Cuts Commissioner Greg Thielmann analyzes the fresh New START data recently released by the State Department. Thielmann comes to the conclusion that "in the broadest sense, there is no change in the fundamentals underlying nuclear force trends since New START was signed in 2010. Both sides are modernizing their nuclear arsenals, and are hovering around the core treaty limitation on deployed warheads. But the modernization chronologies for the two countries are different. Russia is saddled with the need to catch up from the lean years of the 1990s. The only way it can avoid a dip in deployed warheads is to repeatedly extend the service lives of missiles and submarines, whether or not it makes financial or technical sense." Click here ...

"Rarely are foreign and security policy challenges characterized by such strong countervailing pressures or outcomes so replete with irony as in the conduct of U.S.-Russian affairs after Moscow’s 2014 military intervention in Ukraine," writes Deep Cuts Commissioner Greg Thielmann in his latest blog post for the Arms Control Association. "As Washington policy-makers and politicians try to settle on new guidelines for the bilateral relationship, they should seek a tough-minded but pragmatic diplomacy, realizing that, without U.S.-Russian negotiations, there will be no significant progress on either nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear disarmament." Click here ...

"NATO needs a new strategy towards Russia," says Deep Cuts Commissioner Ulrich Kuehn in his latest intervention for the New Perspectives journal. "The current strategy is imbalanced because it over-emphasizes power and risks negatively affecting the European security order. A new strategy should recall the 1967 Harmel Report, which successfully combined the security elements of power, order, and liberal values. Today, such a balanced strategy is again needed. A new Harmel strategy (Harmel 2.0) should, like its predecessor, rely on a combination of deterrence and engagement." Click here ...

The possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities, compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of nuclear weapons, has become disturbingly real, says Andrew Futter (University of Leicester). While this challenge will impact all nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the United States and Russia given their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces. In this new Deep Cuts Issue Brief, Andrew Futter analyzes the dynamics caused by potential cyber insecurity and their impact on arms control and possible future nuclear reductions and offers a number of concrete suggestions on how to address this complex interplay. Click here ...

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